# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC

Market Metaphor K

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

### 1NC

T-USFG

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal 16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services

OECD 3 – OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

Definition:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law.

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### The ‘core’ antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Michael A. Rataj 21, PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws”, 5/12/2021, https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/

The core antitrust laws are…

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.

The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

#### Only topical affirmatives provide roles for each side key to the process of negation---two impacts:

#### 1) Clash---prepared negative strategies are based on method. Allowing the aff to skirt that question while retaining traditional competition standards makes being neg impossible. Clash is an intrinsic good and vital to the overall process of debate. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

#### 2) Fairness---voluntary activities require it to actualize their benefits---only the ballot can adjudicate which model is fairest and overcome cognitive biases that otherwise cause a race to the bottom.

Hansson et al. 21, Kajsa Hansson, Ph.D. student at Linköping University, M.S. in Economics from Linköping University; Emil Persson, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Linköping University, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Gothenburg; Shai Davidai, Assistant Professor in the Management Division of Columbia Business School, Ph.D. from Cornell University; Gustav Tinghög, Associate Professor in the Department of Management and Engineering at Linköping University, “Losing sense of fairness: How information about a level playing field reduces selfish behavior,” Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, Vol. 190, October 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.014

Why is aggressive, hostile, and selfish behavior so rampant in competitive settings? Using a novel experimental paradigm, we found that the absence of explicit information about a level playing field increases people’s tendency to engage in selfish behavior. Whereas participants who formed their own subjective beliefs about the fairness of a competition more frequently engaged in self-serving and selfish behavior, providing explicit information about the level playing field reduced such behavior. However, while this information reduced selfish behavior among losing participants, it did not affect behavior among winners of the competition. Losers who formed their own subjective beliefs of the playing field believed that the competition was unequally stacked against them. In contrast to losers who were informed about that both participants competed under the same sets of rules, they were more willing to engage in selfish behavior following the competition.

Our results suggest that information about a level playing field can reduce the “moral wiggle room” which people use to justify selfish behavior.9 Just as people are more prone to engage in selfish behavior when the consequences of their actions are sufficiently vague and uncertain, (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Exley, 2016; Haisley and Weber, 2010), we find that the absence of explicit information about the procedure of a competition may have similar effects on selfish behavior, and especially so among those who end up losing.

How well people perform in competitive settings is the product of numerous factors, many of which are beyond people’s control. For instance, whether people perform well or poorly in a competition is determined by their inherent ability or skill, by the amount of effort they devote to the competition, by their opponents’ abilities and skills, by the amount of effort devoted by each of their opponent, by external factors that advance or hinder their and their opponents’ performance, and so forth. People typically focus on only a subset of such factors when thinking about their and others’ performance (Davidai and Gilovich, 2015). Yet, the myriad of elements that influence performance provide people with sufficient flexibility to feel as if their relative inferiority is due to factors outside their control rather than personal inadequacy. Consequently, by forcing people to take responsibility for their performance and learn from their failures, informing people about a level playing field may have other positive effects beyond reducing selfish behavior.

Our results are consistent with findings from previous studies showing that losing a competition increases the demand for redistribution, even when people make choices for two other participants (i.e. absent any selfish motives) (Cassar and Klein, 2019; Deffains et al., 2016; Espinosa et al., 2020). In line with the results from our study, Espinosa (2020) showed that when participants are informed that outcomes of a competition is determined by brute luck — i.e., whether one was randomly assigned to perform either a hard or an easy task — before the competition begins, winners and losers of the competition display similar redistributive preferences when making decisions for other people. We add to this literature by showing that the effect of informing people about a level playing field also decreases selfish behavior. Although previous studies have found that actual procedural unfairness that involves unequal opportunities increases unethical and selfish behavior (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2018; Fehr, 2018; Gill et al., 2013; Greenberg, 1990; Grosch and Rau, 2020; John et al., 2014), our findings highlight the immensely important role that perceived procedural fairness plays in zero-sum competitions, where resources are scarce, and several people compete for the same rewards.

Because disagreements regarding fairness may result in aggression, hostility, and conflict between successful and unsuccessful individuals, understanding when and why the outcomes of competitions are considered legitimate is extremely important. Simply put, leaving people “in the dark” regarding the playing field may undermine cooperation, trust, and legitimacy in society. Unfortunately, this dynamic is often seen in our own back yard, where wayward researchers tend to lose sight of the common goal of the scientific endeavor and instead engage in misconduct, fraud, and uncooperative behavior to promote their own selfish goals (e.g., John et al., 2012). We suggest that by bolstering people’s beliefs about a level playing field, transparency can reduce such self-serving and often-destructive research practices. Whereas arranging fair procedures and practices is of upmost importance for creating a more just and ethical society, informing people about this procedural fairness is key.

### 1NC

ADV CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### ---establish that the technology sector’s development of AI technologies is an anticompetitive business practice;

#### ---establish that civil society is an anticompetitive business practice;

#### ---prohibit anticompetitive business practices.

#### Monopoly capitalism worsens every form of oppression and antitrust advocacy strengthens every angle of resistance.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power.

The Racial Wealth Gap

Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place.

Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite.

Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality.

• Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38

• Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39

• Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40

• Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41

• Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans).

The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists.

The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt.

America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration

The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46

As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions.

Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6.

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements

There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities.

To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.

### 1NC

Racial Capitalism PIK

#### We advocate for the entirety of the 1AC sans the analysis of ‘racial capitalism.’

#### ‘Racial capitalism’ as an analytic mystifies social relations AND is foundationally inaccurate---reject it.

Julian Go 21, Professor, Sociology, University of Chicago, "Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism," Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, Issue 1, pg. 38-44, 2021, SAGE.

The term racial capitalism is by now something of a buzzword. It has become especially prominent among historians who are rethinking the relationship between slavery and capitalism (Johnson 2018; Kelley 2017; Robinson 2000). It has also been used by legal scholars, health scholars, philosophers, ethnic studies scholars, political scientists, and, of course, sociologists (Dawson 2018; Fraser 2019; Leong 2013; Melamed 2015; Pirtle 2020; Virdee 2019). As a term, its origins lie in Marxist intellectuals and activists writing in the context of South African apartheid in the 1970s (Hudson 2018; Legassick and Hemson 1976; Nupen 1972). More recently, Robinson (2000) helped popularize the term in his analysis of the conditions under which the “black radical tradition” emerged.

Despite this emerging literature, the relevance of existing discussions of racial capitalism for sociological theory remains unclear. What might the racial capitalism literature teach us about theories or conceptual frameworks around race and capitalism? The problem is that the term racial capitalism does not refer to a “theory” in the sense of a “singular logically integrated causal explanation” (Calhoun 1995:5). The term refers broadly to relationships between racial inequality and capitalism, but the literature does not specify a single set of causal relations or connections between them. Nor does the literature offer uniform concepts or a shared conceptual apparatus. Given this, does the racial capitalism literature—by which I mean the scholars across different disciplines who centralize the term racial capitalism—have any relevance for theory at all?1

In this essay, I offer the beginnings of an answer by identifying three aporias, or theoretical tensions, in the existing literature. The first tension has to do with the concept of race itself. What does the signifier race in the term racial capitalism actually mean? The second has to do with the inadequacies of existing theory, particularly Marxist theories of capitalism, that the racial capitalism literature is meant to remedy. The third has to do with whether racism is immanent to capitalism or contingent, which in turn raises the issue of social difference in modern capitalism.

In highlighting these tensions, my point is not to criticize or disavow the racial capitalism literature but rather to highlight some of the main underlying themes or issues that I think are generative of further conceptualization, theorizing, and research. Accordingly, although I do not seek to fully resolve these three tensions, I offer some ways we might think about and work with them in a productive manner.

Defining Racial Capitalism

To start, a brief overview of the meaning of the term racial capitalism is warranted. This is difficult, however, because definitions in the existing literature are either murky or differ from one another. Pirtle (2020), writing on the racial inequalities of coronavirus disease 2019, used the term but did not define it. Leong (2013:2190) used racial capitalism to refer to how white institutions appropriate nonwhite identities as symbolic capital. Ralph and Singhal (2020) found that the term is used largely to “explain how racialism merged with capitalism . . . and to highlight coercion and productivity in capital investment and forms of exchange” (p. 857). The South African Marxists Legassick and Hemson (1976) and the National Union of South African Students were among the first to use the term before Cedric Robinson (2000) deployed it, but they used the term to specify the particularity of apartheid, whereas Robinson used it to refer to global capitalism as it first emerged in Europe.

Despite these complexities, it is possible to identify shared features of the term. First, racial capitalism implies that there are deep connections between racism or racial inequality and capitalism. Much of the literature refers to historical connections, such as those between precapitalist racial divisions in Europe and the subsequent development of capitalism (Kelley 2017; Robinson 2000) or between slavery and capitalist development (Johnson 2018, 2020). Maybe this is why so many historians have taken to the concept. But the term is also used by social scientists to refer to more recent connections. South African intellectuals’ and activists’ use of the term referred to how apartheid and the South African economy were mutually dependent. Other scholars use the term to highlight disparities within the working class, which was one of Robinson’s (2000) concerns (see also Melamed 2015:77). Others emphasize how capitalism is presently dependent on violence and dispossession—social relations that conventional theories of capitalism such as Marx’s treat as irrelevant to the system, aberrations from it, or precursors to it (Ralph and Singhal 2019:857). Throughout these usages, the overarching point appears to be to explore and disclose the ways “racial hierarchies can be functional for capitalist social orders” and vice versa (Dawson 2018).

A second component of the term racial capitalism is that it is typically used to refer to global relations rather than capitalism within a single national context. South African intellectuals used the term to capture South Africa’s particular situation, but they insinuated that South Africa exhibited a particular variant of a system that was replicated cross-nationally. Robinson, and others in the same tradition, from DuBois to Oliver Cox, all discussed race on a global scale, exploring histories of colonial conquest, imperialism, and dispossession to make visible capitalism’s relation to race. Historians have shown how slavery was a transatlantic system encompassing transnational and transimperial relations. Racial capitalism, in short, is also global capitalism. The world’s workers constitute, as DuBois (1935) famously put it, the “dark proletariat” (p. 15).

Finally, the racial capitalism concept has political implications. Discussions of racial capitalism among South African intellectuals and activists were explicitly about political projects. After all, if racism and capitalism are intertwined, the antiapartheid struggle also had to be an anticapitalist struggle—and vice versa. “We must come to grips with the assertions of the African masses for political rights and economic prosperity,” declared the National Union of South African Students, “and we must seriously investigate what changes there must be to South Africa’s particular brand of racial capitalism in order to accommodate the fulfilment of these aspirations” (Nupen 1972:2). Walzer (2020) made the political implications of the term even clearer. If racism and capitalism are interconnected, as the racial capitalism thesis holds, then the fight against racism is also a fight against capitalism. But if race and capitalism are not connected, antiracist struggles and anticapitalist struggles must be thought of as separate and distinct struggles, and the struggles must proceed accordingly.

What is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism?

We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism?

Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences.

Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26).

Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse.

Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined.

Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2

Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system.

Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.”

The Inadequacy of Existing Theory

A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism.

But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864).

How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism.4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete.

Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018).

This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital.

Necessity, Contingency, and Difference

The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7

For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9

So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short.

Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11

### 1NC

Anarchy PIK

#### We advocate for the entirety of the 1AC sans the endorsement of anarchic violence directly against the state.

#### Revolution necessitates violent retaliation, causes spiraling global conflict, and reifies violent structures.

Dr. George Lawson 11, Associate Professor, International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Halliday's Revenge: Revolutions and International Relations,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, pg. 1069-1071, September 2011, JSTOR. edited for OCR errors and language differential.

Third, Halliday took seriously the major claim of revolutionaries: that because the international system (whether understood as capitalist, imperialist or a mixture of the two) was the fundamental source of their oppression, the legitimacy of revolutions rested on establishing a novel, more emancipatory system in its place. As a result, revolutionary states saw their struggles not as contained within the limits of state borders, but as transcending existing boundaries. Marx and Engels, for example, thought that communism could not exist 'as a local event. The prole-tariat can only exist on the world-historical plane, just as communism, its activity, can only have a world-historical existence.'10 Lenin makes this point starkly: 'global class, global party, global revolution' ( Weltklasse , Weltpartei, Weltrevolution).11 And Che Guevara turned it into a battle-cry of anti-imperialism in his 'Message to the People of the World':

How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the globe . . . what difference do the dangers to a human being or people matter when what is at stake is the destiny of humanity. Our every action is a battle cry against imperialism and a call for the unity of the peoples . . . Wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome.12

The centrality of international oppression to the analysis of revolutionaries, Halliday argued, meant that revolutionary movements ran counter to the ground rules of international order (sovereignty, international law and diplomacy), proclaiming ideals of 'universal society' and world revolution. Revolutions challenged international order in a number of ways, ranging from disrupting existing patterns of trade and alliances to questioning underlying rules, norms and principles. To take one example, the challenge of the Bolshevik Revolution was at once short term (prompting the withdrawal of Russian forces from the First World War), medium term (in the provision of support for allied states) and long term (in the establishment of a systemic alternative to market democracy). As Halliday argued, revolutionary states forced Great Powers to act by challenging their credibility as Great Powers. In other words, in order to justify their position at the apex of the international system, Great Powers were required to quell revolutions.13 As such, counter-revolution was not an instrumental reaction to moments of revolutionary upheaval, but a process hard-wired into the fundamentals of international relations itself.14

The fourth international component of revolution lay, for Halliday, in its close association with war. As Stephen Walt notes, revolutions intensify the prospect of war in three ways.15 First, revolutions provide a window of opportunity for states to improve their position vis-a-vis other states, for example by seizing territory, attacking a state previously protected by the old regime, or generating conflict between the revolutionary state and its rivals. In particular, because revolutionary regimes are beset by civil strife and elite fracture, other states may seize the chance to attack the revolutionary regime. Second, this 'window of opportunity' generates 'spirals of suspicion' as the uncertainty produced by the revolution heightens levels of insecurity that, in turn, raise perceptions of threat.16 Finally, revolutionary states seek to export their revolution, both as a way of shoring up their fragile position at home and because of their ideological commitment to an alternative international order. Concomitantly, counter-revolutionary states assume both that revolution will spread unless it is 'strangled in its crib', and that revolution will be relatively easy to reverse.17 This 'perverse combination' of insecurity and overconfidence heightens the prospects of interstate conflict.18 By increasing uncertainty and fear, by altering capabilities and by raising threat perceptions, revolutionary states begin a process which, quite often, leads to war.

For Halliday, therefore, revolutions are always international events: revolutions have international causes, revolutionaries seek to export their revolution abroad, and revolutions share a close relationship with both counter-revolution and war. In this sense, revolutionary states exhibit a particular form of 'revolutionary sovereignty', one which legitimizes domestic [autocracy] autarchy and international intervention simultaneously. However, as Halliday recognized, the effects of revolutions on the international system are uneven. Hence, while the Bolshevik Revolution ushered in over 80 years of conflict between state socialism and market democracy, it is difficult to see many large-scale ramifications that arose from the Mexican or Ethiopian revolutions. At the same time, there is a paradox at the heart of the relationship between revolutionary states and the international system: revolutionary states must establish relations with other states and coexist with the system's rules, laws and institutions, even while professing to reject these practices. As such, pressures to conform provide a counterweight to claims of self-reliance and international contestation. Despite challenging existing patterns of interaction and hierarchy, revolutionary states play their part in reproducing regimes governing trade, alliance formation and security. Indeed, the often tenuous nature of revolutionary regimes, besieged from without and within by counter-revolutionary forces, means that they take claims to domestic sovereignty and state security seriously. As such, they often serve to strengthen the very states system that they seek to undermine. Although this is some way short of domesti-cation or 'socialization, in order to function as states revolutionary states give up many of their revolutionary aims.19

Halliday did not merely see revolution as an important topic for IR; he also thought that IR had much to offer sociological and historical accounts of revolution. First, international factors (defeat in war, the vicissitudes of the market and shifting alliance structures) often precipitated and prompted revolutionary crisis. Second, international actors played a major role in encouraging revolutions via arms, aid and the power of example. Finally, revolutionary foreign policies were committed to the export of revolution, albeit with mixed success. As such, IR scholarship aided the general study of revolution by making apparent its modular features: the 'period of grace' offered to revolutionary regimes as foreign powers assessed its challenge; 'active confrontation' as this challenge was met by counter- revolution and war; and finally, long-term 'accommodation' as both sides of the conflict took part in symbiotic, if unequal, exchanges.20 The history of international relations also demonstrated that, for all the 'voluntarist delusions' of revolutionaries from Trotsky to Guevara, the particular contexts in which revolutions emerged meant that emulation was, at best, a remote possibility.21

#### AND those movements invariably collapse---BUT, in the long term, drive states to magnify violence, rather than depress it.

Michael E. Newell 19, Ph.D. Syracuse University. M.A. Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. B.A. International Relations and Diplomacy, and Economics, Ohio State University. Lecturer for the Academic Inquiry and Scholarship program for the Social Science and Exploratory Pathways at University of Texas at San Antonio, "How the Normative Resistance of Anarchism Shaped the State Monopoly on Violence," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 25, Issue 4, pg. 1237-1255, 05/14/2019, SAGE.

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 called upon states to prevent terrorist violence through information exchanges, the suppression of terrorist funds, the creation of a new United Nations (UN) Counterterrorism Committee, and the regulation of the movement of individual terrorist suspects.1 The Resolution signaled that state officials recognize a shared obligation to reassert state control of violence against the challenge posed by non-state actors. As this suggests, while typically considered an essential attribute or a defining feature of statehood, the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is better understood as an ideal type, which, as an ideal, prescribes normative obligations.2 To this end, existing contributions to the literature have examined the historical evolution of the “state monopoly norm,” or “Weberian norms,” through case studies of the Barbary pirates, mercenaries, privateers, post-colonial conflicts, and the more recent war on terror (Krahmann, 2013; Löwenheim, 2007; Philpott, 2001; Thomson, 1994). These existing accounts have traced the historical development of the normative elements of the state monopoly on violence, including the acceptability of the production and control of the means of violence by the state, the proscription of violence by non-state actors, states’ obligation to prevent non-state violence emanating from their territory, and the constitution of states as the legitimate holders of authority over violence. As these elements indicate, the state monopoly is a confluence of both regulatory norms relating to the behavior of state and non-state actors, and constitutive norms that shape legitimate forms of statehood and uses of force.

Existing scholarship on Weberian norms would indicate that the UNSC Resolution and other contemporary multilateral counterterrorism institutions are a continuation of the norms first articulated in response to piracy through the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Yet, such a conclusion would fail to account for how the Declaration’s abolition of privateering and protection of neutral ships in a time of war developed into the more substantive obligations seen in response to contemporary terrorism. Instead, crucial changes to the norms on legitimate violence occurred in the heretofore understudied years prior to the First World War in response to violence associated with the transnational anarchist movement. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, anarchism sought to undermine state authority through a philosophy of “direct action” involving violent, insurrectional acts against European and American states. Anarchism challenged the norms constituting the authority and legitimacy of states, and provoked the reassertion of normative rules and their expansion through new forms of state authority. These were changes in the regulative norms of the state monopoly on violence, but they occurred because the anarchists posed threats to core constitutive norms.

Filling this gap in the chronological record helps us to understand why the complex of regulative and constitutive norms of the state monopoly on violence that we have today differs markedly in content from what existed in the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Existing accounts of Weberian norms have thus far overlooked the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms, as well as their different levels of importance in norm contestation and development. At the same time, the preoccupation with state actors in the history of these norms has failed to adequately theorize the role played by deviant non-state actors in normative evolution and change. This study demonstrates the importance of these concepts by situating them within recent theoretical scholarship on resistance to norms, and by deploying a wealth of new empirical material to explore the connection between the anarchists’ contestation of the core constitutive dimensions of the norms on legitimate violence and state efforts to reconstitute, and significantly expand, their regulative normative obligations. This included the International Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome in 1898 and the St. Petersburg Protocol of 1904, which were the earliest identified instances of multilateral counterterrorism (Romaniuk, 2010). State officials agreed to reorient their foreign relations and domestic security policies to suppress private, individual violence, and to expand formal cooperative security arrangements. Consequently, an adequate understanding of contemporary counterterrorist cooperation, and of the normative authority of states upon which much of international relations rests, requires an examination of this historical period.

The normative basis of the monopoly on violence

Existing literature on the monopoly on violence often considers it an attribute, or permanent fixture, of statehood. For example, Weber (1964: 154) argues that a defining characteristic of the state is that it “successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” Likewise, Tilly’s (1975: 638) definition of the state includes “controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory,” while Giddens (1985: 121) includes the “direct control of the means of internal and external violence” within “a territory demarcated by boundaries.”3 Each of these definitions assumes the state’s control over violence, but, as a strict rule, the monopoly on violence ensures that many, if not all, modern governments are not states. For example, Giddens (1985: 16) notes that “all class-divided societies, no matter how strong the military forces commanded by the state … [experience] armed opposition that escapes the control of the central apparatus.” As Milner points out, even Hobbes’s Leviathan, upon which many modern definitions of statehood rest, does not possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, as Hobbes (cited in Milner, 1991: 72) states that “A covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void.”

Rather than an essential attribute or a defining feature, the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is better understood as an ideal type of statehood, which, as an ideal, prescribes normative obligations. In particular, the monopoly on violence is composed of both constitutive and regulative norms. This distinction recognizes that certain norms constitute international political actors by shaping meanings, identities, and interests, while other norms regulate their behavior through constraining or permissive features (Björkdahl, 2002: 15–16; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891; Sending, 2002: 452). Specifically, the monopoly on violence is composed of constitutive norms that establish states as the sole legitimate users of violence and non-state actors as illegitimate users of violence. The type of actor identified as “a state” is constituted, in part, by international norms regarding what form of authority may legitimately lay claim to the use of violence. Additionally, the monopoly on violence places at least three regulative normative obligations on states: first, the state should exercise control over the means of violence; second, the state should prevent non-state actors from using violence; and, third, the state should be accountable for instances of non-state violence emanating from its territory. Likewise, these regulative norms alter the behavior of non-state actors by prohibiting their use of violence.

While it may be mistaken to identify the monopoly on violence as a natural “attribute” of statehood, definitions of this type nonetheless capture its central importance as a “fundamental institution” of international relations (Reus-Smit, 1997). Reus-Smit (1997: 556) identifies fundamental institutions, including sovereignty, as those that compose the “underlying normative foundations of international society,” and that are often “embedded in larger complexes of constitutive metavalues.” This vision of international norms as nested within a complex of interrelated parts has been further described in Alter and Meunier’s (2009) account of regime complexity. Weberian norms are likewise embedded within these structures as core norms underpinning state sovereignty. At the same time, the state monopoly on violence is itself composed of multiple, interrelated norms, including the aforementioned constitutive and regulative normative components. Consequently, Weberian norms may be identified as a “norm complex,” a set of interactive normative obligations that reinforce one another, and that are embedded within a broader structure of complex, overlapping institutions.

As a norm, the monopoly on violence underwent a “life cycle” of development, including periods of emergence, acceptance, and internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Existing accounts of Weberian norms have explored many of the significant moments of their development. In particular, Thomson’s (1994: 4) examination of piracy, mercenaries, and privateering shows that “interactions between state rulers” led to the “delegitimation and abolition of nonstate violence,” such that states had to accept “responsibility for violence emanating from [their] territory.” These obligations were worked out between state rulers, particularly in the 19th century. This meant that the impetus for the state’s monopoly on violence developed within international interactions rather than domestic society (Thomson, 1994: 4), and gave rise to an international norm obligating states to prevent piracy within their territorial waters. The anti-piracy norm then aided the development of a universal norm against all non-state violence (Thomson, 1994: 117–118). Rather than simply a defining attribute of statehood, “once the antinonstate violence norms were implemented, they became the new standard of state practice. An is became an ought” (Thomson, 1994: 152).

Contestation of the state monopoly norm

Recent scholarship on international norms draws attention to actors who do not accept the same contextual basis for the application of norms and seek to contest or even reject them. Scholarship on norm contestation, defined as “the range of social practices, which discursively express disapproval of norms” (Wiener, 2014: 1), argues that international norms are fluid and dynamic. Rather than shared understandings that provide relatively stable categories of norm followers and norm violators, recognition of the contested character of norms suggests a more complicated picture of normative development.4 In recognition of this, recent literature has identified distinct types of normative resistance in addition to contestation, including: norm entrepreneurship and antipreneurship (Bloomfield and Scott, 2017); normative deviance, defined as “persistent and/or grave violators of core norms of the international community” (Wagner et al., 2014: 4; see also Nincic, 2005); and normative transgression (Evers, 2017). Each of these relates to a degree of resistance to, or even rejection of, prevailing norms.

The state monopoly on violence is composed of both constitutive and regulative norms, and contestation of these norms has come variously from non-state actors working either within or outside of state authority, as discussed by Löwenheim (2007). These aspects of Weberian norms make Evers’s (2017) framework of normative transgression particularly relevant. This approach disaggregates norm complexes in order to distinguish between regulative versus constitutive normative resistance, and it combines these forms of resistance with two types of actors, which, similar to Löwenheim (2007), Evers labels insiders and outsiders of normative authority. Through this combination, Evers produces a typology of four types of transgression, including rejective (regulative violations by outsiders), adaptive (regulative violations by insiders), inclusionary (constitutive violations by outsiders), and exclusionary (constitutive violations by insiders). Evers (2017: 786–787) argues that these types of norm transgressions correspond to the communicative intent of the violation and the stigmatization by international society that the act engenders. While these actions are typically examined through the perspective of actors who accept the normative status quo, Evers’s framework reverses this by treating the violation as a purposeful act of contestation. Accordingly, actors use purposeful violations of international norms to “assert their identity as insiders or outsiders” out of a “desire for recognition,” and to contest the constitutive norms that underpin this distinction (Evers, 2017: 786).

This framework explains three key facets of the normative development and contestation of the state monopoly on violence. First, applying Evers’s framework of normative transgression to the empirical case of Weberian norms brings a necessary focus on normative resistance as purposeful and motivated by intent. In the case considered here, anarchists fit the description of Evers’s (2017: 786) “inclusionary” norm violators, who seek to “undermine the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.” As will be demonstrated in the following section, anarchist publications and speeches show that a unifying purpose of their movement was normative transgression. Specifically, as “inclusionary” norm violators, the intention of this transgression was the revolutionary aim of undermining existing constitutive norms by refashioning states as the illegitimate outsiders, while claiming legitimacy for their own vision of abolishing all political authority.

Second, as this suggests, disaggregating the Weberian norm complex in order to separately examine regulative and constitutive normative resistance clarifies the normative aims of the actors involved. Expanding upon Löwenheim’s (2007) analysis, I argue that the challenges to state authority central to his distinction between predators and parasites should be understood as the contestation of specific components of Weberian norms. As a challenge to the authority of great power states, “predatory” non-state actors were those who contested core understandings of the meanings, identities, and interests that structure international interactions. These actors were thus contesting constitutive norms, particularly Weberian norms that constituted states as the sole possessors of legitimate violence. In contrast, Löwenheim’s (2007: 14) “parasites” acted within existing structures of authority and did not challenge the constitutive norms underpinning state authority and legitimacy, but rather restricted their rule-violating behavior to regulative norms. Significantly, Löwenheim (2007: 176) observes that only “predators” instigated disciplinary efforts by great power states to “reestablish and reproduce the relations of authority that [previously] existed,” a pattern of behavior observed in the American war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks by al Qaeda, and with the passage of the 1856 Declaration of Paris in response to the 19th century Barbary pirates. In contrast, norm-reinforcing behavior of this extent is not observed in response to the regulative normative violations of “parasites.”

This suggests that the type of normative contestation in question, whether it is directed at constitutive or regulative norms, is related to the extent of norm-reinforcing behavior that follows. Significantly, this observation is borne out by other cases of resistance to the state monopoly norm. For example, like Löwenheim’s predators, Brenner (2016) describes the destabilizing effect of new actors, which he labels “confounding powers” and says challenge accepted patterns of relations between states, a constitutive feature of the system. According to Brenner (2016: 3–4), these actors triggered new boundaries to be drawn between civilization and barbarism, an explanation which suggests that constitutive normative change took place in response to their resistance. The greater ability of constitutive normative resistance to invoke change is also evident in Shirk’s (2017) observation that the anarchists, who threatened the existence of the state as an institutional form, were seen as more threatening than anti-colonialists, who rejected imperialism but accepted the state as a legitimate form of government. Likewise, in the next section, I show that the anarchists contested constitutive norms and, in doing so, provoked state efforts to reaffirm and deepen Weberian norms through the Rome Conference and the St. Petersburg Protocol.

Third, and finally, Evers’s (2017) and Löwenheim’s (2007) distinction between outsiders and insiders underscores the importance of identity formation to the process of normative contestation. As argued by Wagner et al. (2014) and Nincic (2005), persistent challenges to core norms lead some actors to be identified as “deviants.” However, the case of Weberian norms suggests that this is particularly true for non-state actors challenging fundamental constitutive norms. When constitutive norms are transgressed, as was the case in the anarchist challenges to state authority and legitimacy, the actors involved are identified as deviant “outsiders.” Arguably, Adler-Nissen’s (2014) and Zarakol’s (2014) work on stigmatization in international relations explains the dynamics discussed here. Stigmatization is a response to norm-violating actors that results from efforts to “clarify boundaries of acceptable behavior and identity” (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 149) and to reclassify these agents as “different” and “of a less desirable kind” (Zarakol, 2014: 314, citing Goffman, 1963: 3).

The contestation of core constitutive norms led state actors to identify the anarchists as “enemies of humanity,” which further compelled state actors to cooperate and meet their shared obligations to defend Weberian norms against these “enemies.” When facing the transgressions of outsiders, states recognize new normative obligations that they share by virtue of being insiders, such as the requirement to reinforce the norms under question and to aid one another’s efforts to suppress the threatening actions of these outsiders of authority. This pattern mirrors the different forms of punishment and normreinforcing behavior that Löwenheim (2007: 72–79) observed in responses to transnational predators when compared to inaction in response to parasites, as well as Brenner’s (2016: 62) “enforcement thesis,” or the expansion of “the range of acceptable activities used against deviators.”

As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) note, norms “prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study.” This article draws on archival records of state correspondence to examine the “trail of communication” of resistance to and development of the state monopoly norm. This includes the records of the British Home Office and Foreign Office, which were photographed at the British National Archives in Kew, England, and the records of the US Congress, accessed via ProQuest Congressional, which includes copies of diplomatic correspondence included in annual summaries of foreign affairs sent to Congress. While existing accounts of the state monopoly norm focus solely on the correspondence of state actors, this article also draws on the correspondence and publications of anarchists to further examine resistance to the norm. These records come from the online Anarchy Archives, as well as a collection of primary source materials compiled by Ruth Kinna (2006).5

Anarchism and the state monopoly norm

By the time that Errico Malatesta argued for revolutionary “acts” rather than “words” at the eighth Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association (IWMA) in 1876 in Berne, the state monopoly norm had already undergone a significant period of development in the context of international agreements regarding piracy, mercenarism, and privateering (Löwenheim, 2007; Thomson, 1994). By the 1860s, state officials agreed on regulative norms permitting state control of violence, proscribing non-state violence, and obligating states to control non-state violence emanating from their territory. In doing so, they also advanced constitutive norms that lent legitimacy to state authority and control over violence.

Against these prevailing understandings of Weberian norms, anarchist philosophers contested the proscription of non-state violence, and rejected constitutive norms regarding the legitimacy of state institutions. They argued that the authority of the state was predicated on an illegitimate threat of force, and they instead advocated for the principle of “direct action,” also referred to as “propaganda by the deed,” as a justification for the use of violence by non-state actors against this illegitimate rule. The violent actions of a small number of anarchists put this discourse of contestation into practice, leading to early forms of transnational terrorism.

As expected by theoretical accounts of normative resistance and prior case studies of resistance to Weberian norms, the anarchists’ contestation catalyzed normative development and reinforcement. States responded to anarchist violence by attempting to further clarify both constitutive and regulative aspects of the norm through international negotiations and agreements at the Rome Conference and in the St. Petersburg Protocol, as well as through bilateral relations and unilateral statements. These new efforts were protean cooperative security arrangements in which states agreed to take collective responsibility to suppress anarchist violence. Significantly, anarchist violence often took the form of acts by individual wielders of new, destructive technologies. While piracy and mercenarism had compelled state leaders to grapple with the problem of collective nonstate violence, often with regard to groups with some relation to the military forces of the state, uncoordinated anarchist dynamite attacks led to increasing concern about private, individual violence. This expanded the application of regulatory norms prohibiting nonstate violence, and reshaped the internal security forces of states and their external relations. Consequently, anarchists, despite their status as outsiders, indirectly shaped the development of international norms.

Anarchist doctrine as normative contestation

In the context of the Paris Commune, early industrialization, and the development of state controls of capitalism, a combination of utopian and socialist ideas of autonomous communities took root among some political philosophers. Bakunin, Malatesta, Sorel, and Kropotkin are recognized as the earliest anarchists who articulated a philosophy of anarchical “un-rule” in which formal rule systems are seen as “unnecessary and superfluous in the governing of normal men” (Horowitz, 1964: 15).6 The anarchists rejected the state as a form of political rule based on “domination” that, as Mikhail Bakunin said, “implies subjection of the masses, and as a result, their exploitation to the advantage of some governing minority” (Kassel, 2009: 239).

Of particular importance to the anarchists’ rejection of the state was their rejection of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Finding themselves in “the period when the statist system of violence was being developed and consolidated,” and the exercise of violence was becoming “uniformed and regulated,” anarchist thinkers pushed back against this growing control and authority of the state (Thorup, 2008: 335). This was fueled, in part, by the state’s exercise of this authority against the anarchists and their perceived allies in the parallel struggle between capital and labor. Increasingly, European and American states used state and federal troops at the behest of employers to suppress strikes and censored the more violence-prone contributors to the leftist press.7 The anarchists sought to complicate the underlying narrative of the state monopoly norm by arguing that states were not upholding their protective purpose, and portrayed their own normative violations as a necessary response to systemic political injustice. As Emma Goldman stated after the assassination of President McKinley, “I do not advocate violence; government does this, and force begets force.”8

Anarchists saw all state institutions as an illegitimate interference in the lives of people, all state violence as illegitimate force, and resistance to these institutions as morally necessary. The 1907 Amsterdam Anarchist Congress concluded that “the destruction of the capitalist and authoritary [sic] society can only be realised by armed insurrection and violent expropriation,” and that “the more direct means of struggle against the military force of government” must not be forgotten.9 Further complicating the existing normative terrain, anarchists possessed the ability to subvert the state monopoly norm individually as the invention of dynamite meant that “a single wayfarer … throws the cities of England in greater terror than would an army of a hundred thousand men.”10 Through their resistance to international norms and state rule, anarchists positioned themselves as outsiders of authority. They portrayed their violence as “insurrectional acts” against the authority of the state (Kinna, 2006: xxiii). In line with Evers’s (2017) account of normative transgression, these were the “inclusionary” efforts of outsiders who wished to contest and reshape constitutive norms to alter the status quo in their favor.

On the basis of this rejection of the state, anarchists communicated a separate normative doctrine of the legitimate use of force. According to anarchist philosophy, the legitimacy of violence depended on the legitimacy of the cause or objective of the actor, and not on its authority (or statehood). This normative interpretation is implicit in direct action or “propaganda by deed,” or the idea that violent actions could, according to Kropotkin, “compel general attention,” and thus enable new ideas to seep “into people’s minds and [win] converts” (Schmid, 2004: 205).11 The use of direct acts of violence would draw attention to anarchist ideas and display the illegitimacy of the state as it was provoked “to use repressive tactics against the population” (Kassel, 2009: 241). Propaganda by deed inferred a competing understanding of the norm in which violence was justified if it helped to undermine state rule, either through its propagandist, educational function or through the revelation of the violence on which state authority rested. Through this doctrine, the anarchists argued that legitimacy of motive trumped the legality of institutions of armed force, such that what may be a legal use of force from the view of the state was seen as an illegitimate exercise of authority against a legitimate social and political cause. What state officials saw as illegal, non-state violence, the anarchists saw as legitimate resistance to state rule. In this sense, direct action was both a philosophy and tool of normative contestation, designed to both practically and interpretively undermine the constitutive norms on which the state’s legitimate control of violence rested.

The writings of Emma Goldman and other anarchists demonstrate the normative content of anarchist doctrine. In particular, Goldman’s justification of the increased militarization of the Spanish anarchist group the National Working Confederation and Iberian Anarchist Federation (CNT-FAI) provides a clear demonstration of the distinction that anarchists made between legitimate and illegitimate violence. While the CNT-FAI had been condemned by pacifist anarchists for their resort to violence, Goldman justified this as a necessary response to state repression. At an address to the IWMA Congress, she argued that:

True, the tacit consent to militarization on the part of our Spanish comrades was a violent break with their Anarchist past.… I still feel the same abhorrence of militarism, its dehumanization, its brutality and its power to turn men into automatons. But my contact with our comrades at the various fronts during my first visit in 1936 convinced me that some training was certainly needed if our militias were not to be sacrificed like newborn children on the altar of war.… Once we realised that it would be impossible to meet hordes of Fascists armed to the very teeth, we could not escape the next step, which was militarisation.12

Goldman’s argument rests both on the perceived illegitimacy of state institutions and violence, and the legitimacy of the armed defense of anarchist ideology and class struggle. According to Goldman, anarchists’ and other revolutionaries’ violations of the prohibition of non-state violence were justified as a response to the illegitimate and coercive violence of the state.

These arguments are reflected elsewhere in the writings of Goldman, Most, Berkman, and Kropotkin. Goldman and Most jointly argued in an 1896 magazine article that “Anarchists feel convinced that ‘violence’ is not any more reprehensible toward carrying out their designs than it is when used by an oppressed people to obtain freedom.”13 Accordingly, violence is justified when based on the just cause of oppressed peoples. Likewise, anarchists also criticized state violence as filling a protective role only for capitalist interests. Peter Kropotkin stated bluntly that “Wars … are fought for markets,” and in response to the US declaration of war in the First World War, Alexander Berkman and Goldman wrote that US leaders had responded as “Wall Street sounded the bugle ordering the retreat of Humanity,” and “There began a campaign of war publicity that roused the tiger in man and fed his lust for blood and vengeance.”14 Goldman also generally rejected the “myths of protection” upon which the state monopoly norm rests, arguing that:

The most absurd apology for authority and law is that they serve to diminish crime. Aside from the fact that the State is itself the greatest criminal, breaking every written and natural law, stealing in the form of taxes, killing in the form of war and capital punishment, it has come to an absolute standstill in coping with crime.15

Peter Kropotkin then wrote of the negative consequences of the state’s monopoly on violence, arguing against the “endless development of armed force,” “inventions for the more effectual destruction of our fellow-men,” and the training of soldiers “in hatred of the Prussian, the English or the Slav; drilled in blind obedience to the government of the moment.”16

These doctrinal and normative beliefs were adopted by various anarchist and revolutionary organizations beyond those already identified. For example, the International Working People’s Association (IWPA) saw the use of state militias against strikes as evidence of the necessity to arm workers against the forces of the state (Avrich, 1984: 160). Likewise, in the US, a split within the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) led to the formation of new, revolutionary groups that rejected gradual reform through elections.17 After this split, more moderate groups favored the necessity to arm workers for the purposes of self-defense alone, including the Lehr-und-Wehr Verein (Education and Defense Society), while a smaller set of groups began to espouse the use of violence outside of defensive measures. These groups were most invested in practicing the doctrine of direct action and propaganda by deed, and they communicated the perceived legitimacy of their violence through annual conventions, public speeches, and the publication of periodicals.

Disaggregating the Weberian norm complex illustrates the significance of constitutive normative contestation in shaping interactions between deviant and normalizing actors. The constitutive normative resistance of the anarchists contrasted with the mainly regulative normative violations of other violent non-state actors at this time who otherwise accepted the authority and legitimacy of the state. For example, in a history of this period, Thorup (2008) distinguishes between the anarchist and the “partisan,” or between those who see the state system as a threat in itself versus those non-state actors who share some of the underlying normative assumptions of states and seek their recognition. These “partisans” shared the anarchists’ resistance to the regulative norms of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but not the rejection of the constitutive norms of the state as a legitimate authority. For example, Irish and Irish-American Fenian organizations did not contest the underlying legitimacy of the state system as their purpose was an independent Irish state, but they shared the anarchist rejection of the state monopoly to justify their tactics of “skirmishing,” or the use of militias and dynamite attacks to maintain a presence of resistance against illegitimate state rule. As Whelehan (2012: 2) argues, both the Fenians and the anarchists believed “violence to be the midwife of a new society.” However, for the Fenians, this new society reflected changes within the state, while for anarchists, this meant the elimination of state institutions.

These ideas and organizations eventually produced multiple instances of violence, particularly in the 1880s and 1890s. The Fenians undertook a dynamite campaign in England in the 1880s, and the 1890s became known as the “decade of regicide,” in which more state leaders were assassinated than in any other time in history, often by individuals who supported anarchist philosophy (Jensen, 2014a: 31). Yet, the dynamite attacks of the Fenians elicited little to no active concern outside of Britain, even in the US, where the Fenians recruited and raised funds. In contrast, the anarchists elicited multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral efforts by states that gave rise to new expectations regarding the control of non-state violence.

Consequently, the history of anarchist terrorism reconfirms a pattern seen elsewhere in the literature on resistance to Weberian norms, including Löwenheim’s (2007) arguments regarding parasites versus predators, Brenner’s (2016) argument regarding the threat of confounding powers who reject constitutive norms of state authority, and Shirk’s (2017) distinction between revolutionary and anti-colonial violence. As the previous section discussed, when these contributions to the literature on Weberian norms are combined with that of norm resistance, a pattern can be identified where states reacted less to regulative versus constitutive normative resistance. The anarchists threatened the constitutive norms of state legitimacy and the distinction between insiders and outsiders of state authority. As the next section will show, this challenge to core constitutive Weberian norms compelled states to recognize new normative obligations that they felt were necessary to reinforce these rules.

State responses to anarchist contestation

The anarchists failed to achieve acceptance of their particular normative understandings on the use of force and the illegitimacy of the state. Taking Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998: 895) conceptual framing, while new normative understandings emerged within the community of anarchist supporters and sympathizers that opposed the norm of the state monopoly on violence and that supported the legitimacy of violence when it was associated with legitimate ends, this norm emergence was not met with wider acceptance. Instead, the norm of the state monopoly on violence continued to be more authoritative, and to shape both state and sub-state interactions.

However, despite the anarchists’ failure to have their specific normative understandings gain acceptance, they nonetheless affected the development of the norm. Anarchists’ contestation through publications, public speeches, and episodes of violence provoked responses by the states they targeted. Seeking to reinforce the constitutive normative authority of the monopoly on violence, state actors reacted to this contestation with new expressions of their shared obligations. These responses came, first, in the form of bilateral interactions. In the mid-1890s, following anarchist bombings in France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, bilateral agreements to monitor and exchange information concerning anarchism were made between France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. These early agreements served as important precursors to multilateral agreements, including the 1898 International Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome and the 1904 St. Petersburg Protocol, and these collective expressions of Weberian norms were reinforced by unilateral actions or discourse of state rulers describing terrorism or other non-state violence as illegitimate. These responses then significantly affected the development of this norm, leading to its renewed articulation, new expectations of multilateral cooperation against non-state violence, and expanded applicability to control individual, and not just corporate, violence.

Existing accounts identify the origins of multilateral agreements based upon the norm of the state monopoly on violence in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the UN Charter in 1945, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but the precedent for the legal codification of this norm was set much earlier.18 The anarchists provoked early multilateral agreements to prevent non-state violence emanating from a state’s territory. The first of these was the 1898 International Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome, set in motion by the assassination of Empress Elizabeth of Austria in Italy, which Romaniuk (2010: 20) identifies as “the first attempt by states to coordinate law and policy to combat political violence.” The Conference was attended by diplomats, police officers, and technical, administrative, judicial, and other bureaucratic staff from 21 European states, and was divided between a legal and administrative committee. The legal objectives of the Conference were summarized in British Foreign Office correspondence in 1899 as a “promise to the other Powers” to do the following after the meeting:

1. To amend the law as to having in possession explosive substances and as to conspiracies with intent to cause explosions in foreign countries; 2. To take steps to make crimes of this character extraditable; 3. To propose to Parliament a definition of “political” offences which shall prevent mere assassination or attempt at assassination being regarded as a political offence; 4. To consider whether the law can be usefully strengthened as regards powers of search, &c., for documents inciting to crimes of the above character.19

These objectives represented a clear shift from the earlier, ad hoc agreements surrounding piracy to more substantive and intrusive expectations of domestic reform to combat anarchism.

In addition to these legal objectives, the Conference’s administrative committee sought to manage the logistics of international anti-anarchist cooperation. When it began meeting in December 1898, Germany’s initial proposals that each state should agree to increase the surveillance of anarchists, establish a central anti-anarchist agency, and facilitate direct communication and information exchange between these agencies was approved by a nearly unanimous vote (Jensen, 1981: 331). At the end of the Conference, state representatives agreed that their states “should, within a period of three months, acquaint the Cabinet of Rome with their intentions relative to the effect to be given to the proposals made by the Conference, and particularly as regards … the proposals for administrative regulations.”20 State officials had agreed that the threat of anarchism necessitated the consideration of these invasive domestic reforms. Following the Conference, Jensen (2014a: 171–172) notes that the agreement to support extradition for political murder was accepted as “standard practice” by the First World War in Europe as well as Latin America, and that nearly every state at the Conference enacted some degree of the recommended policing measures against anarchists.

While the administrative committee produced tangible changes, the implementation of the objectives of the legislative committee after the Conference was more inconsistent. This led to the creation of the St. Petersburg Protocol, led by the Russians and Germans, who were particularly invested in seeing the objectives of the Rome Conference realized. The Protocol was a “secret” agreement that renewed calls for anti-anarchist cooperation, including the creation of anti-anarchist bureaus in participating states, rules for extraditing or expelling anarchists, and protocols for exchanging intelligence regarding anarchist activity.21 This proposal was signed on March 10, 1904 by 10 states, including Russia, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway (Romaniuk, 2010: 24). This Protocol was an agreement among these 10 states to further increase and formalize international police cooperation, to streamline extradition, and to further the process of creating dedicated anti-anarchist domestic bureaus. These bureaus would regularly inform one another of the movements, expulsions, criminal history, and physical description of anarchists, as well as share photographs of suspects.

In these negotiations, the primary norm entrepreneurs were the officials of Germany and Russia. Not only did these states sponsor the St. Petersburg Protocol, but correspondence in the US and Britain also shows that the initial invitation to the Rome Conference came from the ministers of Germany and Russia, and that subsequent decisions regarding the adoption of these new administrative and legal procedures were addressed and justified to the ministers of these states.22 On the other hand, Britain and the US contested these changes to a certain degree. Britain argued against aspects of the Rome Conference that would require the alteration of their extradition laws on administrative grounds, and they opposed the suppression of anarchist speech on account of liberal norms.23 This collision between liberal and Weberian norms underscores the theoretical observations found in Reus-Smit (1997) and Alter and Meunier (2009) regarding the complexity of normative interactions as changes resulting from one set of norms were thought to undermine the other.

Yet, Britain also agreed to many of the other elements of the Rome Conference. In a 1902 Foreign Office memorandum regarding the German and Russian proposals, it was stated that “His Majesty’s Government are sincerely desirous of co-operating with other Powers for the prevention and repression of Anarchist crime in so far as the institutions and circumstances of this country will permit.”24 Likewise, the US, which did not attend the Rome Conference, but was invited to join European efforts, refused to join international police cooperation on administrative grounds relating to the federalist organization of police forces, and objected to the secrecy of the St. Petersburg Protocol on constitutional grounds (Jensen, 2001: 25). Yet, even the US agreed to aid common anti-anarchist efforts to the extent possible, noting that “The President … would be glad to adopt such administrative measures as were within his constitutional power to cooperate with other governments to the end of eradicating the deadly growth of anarchy from the body politic.”25 Even states that objected to the content of these new arrangements accepted the necessity of broader state cooperation against anarchism. There was a shared sense of the responsibility that states had to uphold the constitutive norms of the system against the resistance of these new violent non-state actors.

While the main subjects of these agreements were European states, anti-anarchism exerted a global influence to a certain degree as well. In a parallel development to the Rome Conference and St. Petersburg Protocol, 16 Latin American states and the US signed an agreement at the Second Pan-American Conference in Mexico City for the extradition of criminals and protection against anarchism (Jensen, 2014a: 274). Suggesting the further spread of anti-anarchist sympathies, US diplomatic correspondence with China regarding the Boxer Rebellion interpreted this unrest through the lens of anarchist and anti-anarchist measures. The US called for the suppression of “these anarchists and rebel populace,” and agreed “to aid in preventing a spread of the disorders to other provinces, and … seeking to these ends a solution which may bring about permanent peace and safety to China.”26

Normative developments for the collective control of private individuals

This period of anti-anarchist activity produced significant changes to the state monopoly on violence. In line with Evers’s (2017: 786) typology, the anarchists fit the description of “inclusionary” norm violators, outsiders who challenged constitutive norms and who sought to “undermine the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.” In response, to reinforce these boundaries, states recognized new normative obligations that they shared by virtue of being insiders, both to suppress the actions of these outsiders and to aid collective efforts against them. In line with Brenner’s (2016: 62) observation that challenges to their constitutive authority lead states to expand “the range of acceptable activities used against deviators,” state actors responded by broadening and deepening Weberian norms in two senses. In particular, the changes produced by anti-anarchism reflected a wider acceptance of multilateral security cooperation, and a deeper effort to regulate the violence of private individuals.

Anti-anarchism produced some of the earliest forms of collective security arrangements. Multilateral efforts against anarchists were the first time that European states agreed to coordinate their activities, and hold one another responsible, to prevent transnational non-state violence. These new obligations eclipsed the more ad hoc forms of cooperation for suppressing transnational violence in the 1856 Declaration of Paris. The result was the “synchronizing” of national anti-anarchist policies, a deeper and more intensive restructuring of state domestic policy to match greater international obligations (Barton, 2015: 325). This acceptance of new institutions of international cooperation corresponded to constitutive normative change in the form of a collective expression of deeper international engagement and interdependence. Likewise, the specific expectations to suppress transnational violence were expressions of regulatory norms regarding what forms of violence were prohibited and what actions states could, and should, take in response.

This historical period thus produced a protean precursor to later, more substantive, cooperative security or collective security arrangements (Adler, 2008; Betts, 1992; Deutsch et al., 1957; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). While scholarship on collective security typically identifies the League of Nations as the earliest example of an attempt by states to “agree to abide by certain norms and rules … and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995: 52–53), anti-anarchism served as an earlier pan-European (and, to a lesser extent, American) collective security experience to stop the aggression of a non-state actor. The Spanish envoy to the US argued in an editorial that unilateral actions against anarchists only meant that “the anarchist agitator who is driven out of one country … finds lodgment in another,” and, as such, states should increase their cooperation and “make the police all over the world a solid, interacting force against [the anarchists].”27 As these early collective efforts against the anarchists primarily involved international police cooperation, Jensen (1981, 2014a) and Thorup (2008) concluded that the Rome and St. Petersburg agreements served as the origins of Interpol.

This growing acceptance of a normative obligation to support multilateral efforts against violent non-state actors was a normalizing act designed to reinforce the constitutive component of Weberian norms. This period of cooperation differed markedly from state responses to the Barbary pirates in earlier historical accounts of the state monopoly norm. In their efforts against the pirates, European states “constantly worked to divert the threat … toward each other” in the years that the pirates were seen as lesser threats, and when Britain decided to finally escalate its conflict with the pirates in the early 1800s, it did so alone (Löwenheim, 2007: 13). There were, however, earlier signs of deeper state cooperation against non-state violence. When Britain attacked the Barbary pirates, other powers accepted this action in a move toward “mutual empowerment,” and “recognition in each other’s authority,” an early sign of changing normative understandings (Löwenheim, 2007: 13–14). However, when faced with the threat of transnational anarchist terrorism, states took this “mutual empowerment” a step further by directly aiding one another’s anti-anarchist efforts and coordinating national policy. State officials also signaled that they understood anti-anarchism to be a continuance of the norms established against pirates. US Senator McComas argued that anarchism should be treated as “crimes against humanity, capable of being punished everywhere … in the same manner as piracy.”28 Similarly, after the assassination of King Umberto of Italy by an ItalianAmerican who had lived in Paterson, New Jersey, US Representative Ray noted that the US has the “full power to define and punish … offenses against the law of nations,” indicating the perceived responsibility to act in defense of core constitutive Weberian norms shared by all nations.29

These statements by US officials are suggestive as to why the anarchists produced such significant change. The anarchists’ normative resistance led state officials to classify them as deviant outsiders who necessitated normative reinforcement by those seeking to uphold the authority of states. The challenge that anarchism posed to the constitutive authority of states was seen as more serious and deserving of a more significant response than the regulative normative violations of other transnational terrorist actors, including the Carbonari or Fenians. Early signs of this change could be seen in the indictment of Johann Most in England for publishing articles seen as inciting and justifying the crime of assassinating a head of state. The language of the ruling reflected the language expected for an “outsider” or deviant, describing Most’s actions as an “utter subversion of all principles of law morality good government and religion to the great scandal of all law established authority and government and to the great danger of the said Sovereigns and Rulers of Europe.”30 Similarly, shortly after the assassination of President McKinley by the anarchist supporter Leon Czolgosz, President Roosevelt stated that:

Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should band against the anarchist. His crime should be made an offense against the law of nations, like piracy and that form of manstealing known as the slave trade; for it is of far blacker infamy than either. 31

These statements were targeted at both defining the terrorist as outside the pale of civilization and as clearly personifying a deviant “other” in the context of a system of states, while also reaffirming the commonality and codependence of states. Roosevelt, for example, compared the common grief and sympathy felt after the deaths of Queen Victoria and Empress Dowager Frederick of Germany to that of the assassination of President McKinley by an anarchist, and expressed the “international relations of mutual respect and good will” that these events motivated.32 State officials saw anti-anarchism as a collective struggle, which aided the creation of new collective expectations.

States’ acceptance of the regulative norms articulated in the Rome Conference and St. Petersburg Protocol was evident in policy changes arising out of these anti-anarchist agreements. Subsequent responses to anarchist violence suggest that states were, in fact, cooperating with one another. Jensen (1981: 333) noted that, with the exception of Britain and France, “all of Europe adhered to the administrative and police committee resolutions” to at least some degree. Specific instances of cooperation are also evident in the archival record. For example, when a Russian foreign minister wrote to the London Police in 1906 alleging the existence of a bomb factory in London belonging to Russian revolutionaries, the police seized the bombs and arrested the individuals at the factory.33 Other examples of state cooperation against anarchism include the agreement of the US to renegotiate its extradition treaties so as to exclude protections for anarchists, and Russian requests for the US to monitor the export of firearms to anarchist committees.34 More generally, the cooperation that grew out of these agreements included tangible increases in the development of domestic mechanisms of surveillance, infiltration, incarceration, and expulsion to prevent or punish non-state violence. Anarchism also contributed to the further development of protections for heads of state and federal investigatory agencies. State legislators passed new laws to suppress anarchism, stop propaganda by the deed, and criminalize the use of explosives.35

A further change signaled by these anti-anarchist efforts included the increased regulation of private, individual violence. As Law (2009: 110) notes in his history of terrorism, anarchism occurred at a time of “Hyper-individualism and hyper-statism,” where terrorism became “the ultimate act of individual protest against not just the state, but the modern condition,” including “enormous bureaucratic states with more coercive power than ever before.” Scholars have identified anarchism as producing the earliest examples of “lone wolf” terrorism, with the caveat that these individuals were united by ideological belief (Spaaij, 2010; Jensen, 2014b). This individualization of violence was aided by the invention of dynamite, which allowed one person to carry the materials necessary to inflict a significant degree of damage. Unfortunately for the aims of the anarchists, their actions accelerated the growth of states’ coercive capabilities by providing a unifying antagonist for state officials. The result was deeper state penetration into the lives of their private citizens and even more expansive state bureaucracies and national police forces to monitor suspect individuals. This mirrored parallel developments in the regulation of private violence, including the rising number of states outlawing individual dueling (see, e.g., Parker, 2001; Wells, 2001).

This significant broadening of Weberian norms to include the suppression of private, individual violence contributed to shifting patterns of states’ interactions with their citizenry. Through the doctrine of direct action and access to new destructive technologies, anarchism arguably embodied a more dangerous form of contestation capable of arising out of individual acts of resistance to the constitutive authority of states. Consequently, anti-anarchism went beyond the regulation of a type of collective non-state violence, as was the case in earlier efforts against privateers, pirates, or mercenaries, and recognized the violent potential of individual bomb-throwers or assassins. This differed further from these earlier efforts given that privateers, pirates, and mercenaries each held at least a tenuous connection to state-sanctioned violence. Mercenaries and privateers were commissioned by states, while pirates were often suspected of being tolerated by the state as a form of unofficial privateering, or because they were former members of state militaries.36 With anarchist terrorism, private violence was no longer a remnant of or cursory attachment to states’ armed forces, but instead a fully individual, non-state affair.

The size and uses of state police forces adapted to enforce the new stigmatization of private, individual violence. As Bayley’s (1985) seminal work on the history of policing has demonstrated, the 19th and 20th centuries saw the consolidation of public, professional, and specialized police forces. Anti-anarchism arguably not only coincided with this change, but helped to diffuse it internationally. This suggests that the new expressions of collective security and of the regulation of violence by private individuals interacted and complimented one another. The administrative changes produced by Rome and St. Petersburg increased information sharing between states regarding the movements, criminal history, and actions of specific individuals. State police forces collected names, locations and physical descriptions, and illustrated or photographed images of individuals suspected of having ties to non-state violence, and disseminated this information to other states. Collective expectations forged in Rome and St. Petersburg were centered on negotiations regarding modern security functions, and created a forum where European officials could discuss these practices and carry new ideas back home. All of these efforts were aimed at reinforcing Weberian norms against the challenges posed by outsiders who sought to contest and revolutionize these fundamental institutions of state authority.

Conclusion

The monopoly on violence should be considered a norm of statehood, and while responses to the pirates, mercenaries, and privateers aided the development of this norm, anarchists and other early forms of terrorism also compelled states to coordinate their restrictions on non-state violence, as well as their shared obligations to prevent such violence in their own territories. These observations bring to light a period of the historiography of this norm previously overlooked in the literature. For all the discussion of anarchy in international relations, more attention should be paid to anarchism as an ideological force that motivated the construction of new regulative and constitutive rules.

The significance of these findings is further evidenced by the long-term effects of anarchism and anti-anarchism. By identifying the significant changes that occurred in this period, later developments in the League of Nations and the development of Interpol appear as the renewed expressions of normative ideas that grew through anti-anarchist interactions. Although the collective security arrangements against anarchism of the Rome Conference and St. Petersburg Protocol were significantly undermined by the onset of the First World War, the proscription of anarchist violence set a precedent for later multilateral acts to regulate non-state violence. Since an 1892 resolution passed by the Institute of International Law, anarchism had been considered “criminal acts directed against the bases of the entire social order” (Jensen, 2009: 103). This view was the basis of the Rome and St. Petersburg efforts to classify anarchism as a crime not of a political nature, allowing for the full powers of extradition to be used against anarchists.37 This definition was then reproduced almost exactly in the 1934 International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law for the legal classification of terrorism: “He, who with the aim of destroying every social organization [or “the entire social order,” (toute organization sociale)] employs any means whatsoever to terrorize the population, will be punished” (Jensen, 2009: 103).

This set the stage for the League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937. While the Convention provided a more generalized definition of terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror,” it likewise identified such acts with common forms of anarchist violence, including attacks on heads of state or other public officials, destruction or damage to property, and the manufacture or possession of arms or ammunition for use in terrorism.38 Furthermore, the agreements of the League’s terrorism convention replicated many of the same anti-anarchist agreements of Rome and St. Petersburg, including the punishment of such acts whether or not they occur within or emanate from a state, the extradition obligations related to these crimes, the agreement to facilitate close contact between police authorities, and obligations to notify and share information about terrorism.39

While states’ anti-anarchist agreements had long-term effects, the normative arguments of anarchists produced limited results. On the one hand, anarchist critiques of illegitimate state authority as a call to justify non-state violence were reproduced in movements of national liberation during the 20th century. Yasser Arafat argued in his speech to the General Assembly in 1974 that:

those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists. Those are the people whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the justice of the cause determines the right to struggle.40

Arafat articulated an understanding of Weberian norms similar to the anarchists’ belief that the legitimate use of force should be decided by just cause and not right authority. However, the crucial difference between these later movements from the anarchists was that national liberation movements sought to be states, not to subvert the state system. As this suggests, against the efforts of the anarchists, by the mid- to late 20th century, the state model had won out as “statehood was rendered as the only possible mode of governance for the world” (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 763). Crucial to this success of the state model was the further development of the international norm of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, which anarchist violence had paradoxically helped to create.

These historical developments also signal important theoretical insights gained by examining Weberian norms through the lens of theories of normative resistance. From this perspective, a clear pattern emerges in the identification of two types of actors in relation to this norm: outsiders of authority who reject both the constitutive and regulative aspects of the norm; and insiders of authority who violate regulative norms but accept the constitutive authority of the state. The anarchists and the Barbary pirates only triggered normative change when they were perceived as challengers to state authority, or, in other words, when their behavior was seen as transgressing constitutive norms. This pattern is consistent across scholarship on Weberian norms. Scholars of normative resistance should take note of this finding, which, if repeated in contexts outside of Weberian norms, may suggest that a key explanation of normative change is, specifically, resistance to constitutive norms.

The struggle against anarchism instigated a push to deepen global norms against nonstate violence that has again intensified in contemporary conflicts with international terrorism. UNSC Resolution 1373 is predicated on the continued relevance of the normative expectations elaborated at the Rome Conference and in the St. Petersburg Protocol. At the same time, the continued treatment of terrorism as a separate, more invasive category of resistance to Weberian norms continues to compel states to justify counterterrorist responses that push against established boundaries of acceptable conduct. Like the “War on Anarchists,” as the New York Times once described it, the contemporary war on terrorism has also produced calls to reassert core norms of state authority.41 The contemporary proliferation of new multilateral and bilateral counterterrorist agreements and institutions is an intensification of the anti-anarchist trajectory begun over one hundred years earlier.

## Case

### Case---1NC

#### Affirmation of mutual aid signifies a resignation to the inevitability of capitalism---the 1AC implicitly adopts an anarchist theory of change that cedes the state and the economy to organized capital---that precludes emergence of a revolutionary socialist movement capable of taking power and rendering mutual aid unnecessary.

Thomas Hummel 20, activist and a member of Marx 21, 6/29/20, “Mutual Aid Networks: Toward a Constructive Critique,” <https://marx21us.org/2020/06/29/mutual-aid-networks-toward-a-constructive-critique/>

Many of the best activists are currently involved in mutual aid work. The extent to which I understand the importance of these organizations is illustrated by my involvement with the one in my neighborhood where I’ve helped with grocery runs for undocumented immigrants and donated some of my stimulus money to keep the organization going. The organization in my neighborhood has raised over $30,000 and has delivered food and essential aid to an impressive number of our neighbors.

While these efforts are incredibly important, we cannot forget that they should be unnecessary. Capitalism and the state that supports it are responsible for a situation in which millions are suffering from privation. In this crisis, the state has been primarily concerned with the maintenance and health of capitalism and has provided only scraps to the vast majority, even as it spends generously to rescue the wealthy. Mutual aid groups have formed to fill this void left by the state’s total disregard for the survival of the most vulnerable.

But since these projects often depend upon us sharing our meager resources, they can be very difficult to maintain. The group in my neighborhood, for example, despite its impressive fundraising, is having difficulty continuing its efforts as new donations dry up. If the left were organized and strong, instead of having to scramble to provide these resources for ourselves, we would be able to apply material pressure and demand them from the state and the wealthy elite that the state protects.

Origins of mutual aid

Looking at the origins of mutual aid philosophy is illuminating. Mutual aid derives from the political philosophy of Anarchism. The term “mutual aid” comes from the anarchist Peter Kropotkin’s 1902 book of the same name, which sought to explore how cooperation, what Kropotkin called “mutual aid,” was “a factor in evolution.”

The issue at hand bears some similarity to a debate going back to the mid-19th century between Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon was a utopian socialist and the father of modern anarchism. Proudhon believed that a new, post-capitalist society could be created alongside capitalism and slowly grow to the point where it became dominant. This process, he believed, could happen in a decentralized way. Marx, by contrast, judged that the capitalist state would never allow this to happen, and would attempt to destroy and undermine these forms of collective care. He argued that the state must be challenged with a fighting organization of the working class. This organized resistance can put pressure on the state and the wealthy, forcing them to provide resources that ordinary people need. But, for Marx, a better society could only come when our forms of organization were strong enough to directly confront the state and replace it with something better.

What’s at stake today is something similar. While acts of solidarity and mutual aid organizations are extremely important, there are limits to what they can achieve inside capitalist society. Organized solidarity entails not just sharing our limited resources between ourselves, but fighting to take them from the rich, whether directly, or indirectly through political demands on the capitalist state. In order for this to be a political movement, and not just a form of charity, organized acts of solidarity and demands on the state need to be made in ways that build class consciousness and organization.

Many socialists have taken on the language and strategy of mutual aid wholesale. In doing so they have unconsciously adopted an anarchist theory of social change and the state. The anarchist theory argues that placing demands on the state only recognizes its authority, strengthens it, and weakens the workers’ movement. Revolutionary socialists, by contrast, share the anarchist opposition to the capitalist state, but think the anarchist approach of ignoring or attempting to circumvent the state is wrong. We believe that the organized working class must engage with and make demands upon the state, while avoiding the social democratic trap of working exclusively through the state, and relying on its reforms. Workers can only achieve a better society by building it for ourselves, brick-by-brick, from the bottom up.

For instance, revolutionary socialists, anarchists, and social democrats can work together with tenants in supporting realistic rent strikes during this time of mass unemployment, and mutual defense against evictions—sometimes cited as a form of mutual aid. But it is also a political act to extend these pressures to demands on the state for a blanket end to evictions, and for rent and mortgage cancellation or moratoriums.

Mutual aid and class struggle at work

“Occupy Sandy” provides a revealing illustration of the merits and limitations of mutual aid work. During the hurricane, a number of New York activists previously involved with “Occupy Wall Street” organized themselves into “Occupy Sandy” around a politics of “mutual aid, not charity.” The group was involved in a lot of important work and provided crucial help to people who were impacted by the storm. However, the political distinction between mutual aid and charity was not always clear to those giving or receiving aid. And despite all its impressive efforts, getting the electricity back on and the subways running ultimately depended upon the state. When the crisis ended, the group left no form of organization behind.

The scale of the crisis today is orders of magnitude larger than it was during the hurricane in 2012, and a much larger portion of the working class has been impacted. The government is currently spending trillions of dollars to prop up banks and corporations. Working people, who create all the wealth in society, need to be getting a share of that. We need to develop strategies that not only spread our limited resources around, but reappropriate what the wealthy have taken from us.

Labor unions, where working people are organized and have leverage against the bosses and corporations, are crucial in the battle for wealth redistribution. An illustrative example comes from the experience of workers in the airline industry. The recent bailout provided the industry with $75 billion. When workers learned this was happening, they organized to ensure that this money would go to help workers and their families get through the crisis. The Flight Attendants Association, led by Sara Nelson, was able to force the airlines into setting aside $29 billion for their workers. This will help pay salaries through the end of September. In a commendable display of solidarity, the union fought for a portion of this aid to go to airport workers as well. The airline workers displayed a willingness to use their power to secure what they needed from their employers. More union actions like this—especially if they were to include greater direct involvement from rank-and-file airline workers—could not only win important material gains, but would also strengthen working class self-organization for future battles against the state and corporations.

Combative social movements will get us the goods

In order to be effective, resistance cannot be the province of a revolutionary minority alone. Since capitalism is creative to the same degree that it is destructive, it tends to breed resistance among people of all walks of life — revolutionary and non-revolutionary alike. It is the role of revolutionaries not to take over these movements, but to intervene and fight alongside those affected in order to win them over to revolutionary politics. Mutual aid networks can be a starting point for people who are radicalizing, but they are most effective when connected to wider movements for change, not seen as an end unto themselves.

We need to build social movements that strive not only to redistribute the few resources available to us, but which also work to reappropriate from the rich the wealth they have taken from us. These movements can translate material pressure into material resources for the majority. They can secure concessions such as medicare-for-all and the inclusion of the undocumented in government aid programs. Bernie Sanders had proposed $2,000 per month for everyone for the duration of the crisis. This is a proposal that combative mass social movements could have the power to actually secure.

Organization, defined as mass involvement, solidarity, and unity-in-action toward a common goal, is the only tool that can give us enough power to take on capital and the state. Without it, we risk just papering over the cracks in capitalism. Only with this tool can we move toward a society based not upon mindless profit for a few, but upon meeting the needs of all. This will allow us to eliminate the conditions that make mutual aid groups necessary, and construct a society based upon solidarity.

#### Their purist stance excludes the possibility of contingent endorsement of state action in particular contexts---turns case and ensures material violence. Cost-benefit analysis of particular policies strengthens anarchist praxis without broadly endorsing the state.

Gearóid Brinn 20, PhD Candidate at the University of Melbourne and Research Assistant at La Trobe University, “Smashing the State Gently: Radical Realism and Realist Anarchism”, European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 19, Number 2, p. 206-227

In the radical context, the statement ‘politics is about power’ challenges not only a perspective that neglects this insight, but one that expressly rejects it. There is a major tendency in contemporary anarchism and anarchist-influenced radicalism that explicitly presents as ‘anti-power’ (Marshall, 2010: 679; Meltzer, 1993: 11), and anti-realist (Holloway, 2005: 18). This approach proposes disengagement and defection from the status quo with the implied expectation that capitalism and the state could wither away through lack of support and without confrontation.9 Realist anarchists oppose this view and argue that realistic efforts to ‘change the world’ unavoidably entail the acquisition and exercise of some forms of power (Mueller, 2003: 128); that the state and capitalism will not disappear without confrontation (Rai, 2015: 177); and that ignoring the current mechanisms of power in the hope that they will go away is not a realistic strategy for radical social change (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425).

For a realist anarchist the statement ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ similarly holds its greatest relevance as a corrective to a mainstream position in radical thought across its history including in the contemporary milieu. Orthodox Marxism, and many of its descendants, held to a long-term vision of a communist utopia where conflict had been reconciled and politics as such had been replaced by ‘the administration of things’ (Adamiak, 1970: 16). Many contemporary anarchists share a similar vision of a post-revolutionary utopia where conflict has been eradicated and where decision-making systems that allow for ongoing disagreement are replaced with those that accept only consensus (see Graeber, 2013: 210–231). Some, like the anti-power tendency discussed above, go beyond the expectation of a future without disagreement and presume the absence of conflict even in the realisation of their utopia. Here ‘everybody’ is made aware of the pressing need for radical social change either through rational argument, or by a sudden realisation or change of consciousness based on the recognition that ‘we are all one’ and have universal shared interests.10 So the realist anarchist perspective on the idea that ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ is not that conflict is universal and inescapable as with the conservative take, but that conflict cannot be completely eradicated, and that no future post-revolutionary society will be free from antagonisms (Edgley, 2000: 73). Nor does the radical interpretation imply that we must forgo radical aims for an uneasy acceptance of pluralism under a liberal democratic modus vivendi. The realist anarchist perspective, however, is not primarily directed at these conservative defences of dictatorship, or at liberal realist pessimism. Instead it is aimed at anarchists and other radicals who see the possibility of a conflict-free utopia, and propose confrontation-free strategies for its realisation that are based either on withdrawing from political struggle, or on successfully convincing all, through education and rational argument, that the proposed radical alternative is in their best interest. The realist anarchist interpretation means that direct and active struggle for positive change, and against oppression, are necessary; that they will continue to be in any future society; and that future visions and current strategies should reflect this (Edgley, 2000: 73; Gordon, 2007: 64–68).

The idea that political thought should be ‘concrete and oriented towards action’ (Geuss, 2008: 95) stands in opposition to anarchist theory that focuses on the articulation of a comprehensive vision of an alternative system of social organisation, with the implied belief that the mere articulation of such a vision should be enough to bring about its realisation. It also counters anarchist perspectives that present as a position of permanent critique without any attempt, or serious belief, that an alternative could actually be achieved, or those similar (in practice) perspectives which posit a revolutionary future based on awaiting some precondition that precipitates radical social change, such as the spontaneous collapse of capitalism due to the unfolding of an inevitable process (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425; 2014 [1924]a: 461).

This entails recognising the imperfectability of radical action and rejecting ‘purist’ revolutionary perspectives. Realist anarchism recognises that all action ‘before the revolution’ is necessarily and unavoidably compromised. Anticapitalists must survive and resist under capitalism while subject to its demands, yet this does not entail that they cannot take any action against it that is not a direct and immediate contribution to the ‘final revolution’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1922] b: 432–433; Rai, 2015: 180). While many anarchists disdain any and all forms of political action that could be construed as reformist, realist anarchists accept that reformism is unavoidable in radical politics. This should not be taken to suggest that realist anarchists exclusively advocate, or even particularly prioritise, reformism. They still, as anarchists, advocate a ‘diversity of tactics’, from prefigurative construction of radical institutions and direct action against oppression, to insurrection and revolution. And as realists they determine the appropriate form of action according to context.

They also argue that, as anarchism is not a fixed idea but a ‘living force’ that constantly responds to and creates ‘new conditions’ (Goldman, 1969: 70), there will always be a need for struggle against oppression, and vigilance against exclusion and subjugation, even after the seemingly most comprehensive and progressive revolutionary change. Any revolution then can only ever be partial, and there can never be a ‘final’ phase of radical social change (Gordon, 2007: 67; Malatesta,2014 [1922]a: 427). Therefore, purist opposition to all reformist struggle is based on an unrealistic hard division between reform and revolution, as revolutions can themselves be seen as ‘the radical reform of institutions, achieved rapidly’ (Malatesta, 1965: 82). So while recognising the importance of revolutionary rupture and upheaval, they also argue that between such events radicals should take ‘all possible reforms with the same spirit that one tears occupied territory from the enemy’s grasp in order to go on advancing’ (Malatesta, 1965: 83).

However, to the extent that realist anarchists endorse reform, they do so only under certain conditions. Firstly, they support reforms that have the capacity to move directly towards radical goals, or to position for future radical gains. To this end they sometimes invoke a distinction similar to that between ‘reformist’ and ‘non-reformist’ reforms articulated by Andre Gorz. Gorz (1967) argued, in relation to labour reforms, that some reforms can have the effect of securing the status quo and others can in fact challenge the status quo and serve as progressive steps towards radical change. Likewise, Malatesta claimed that reforms:

either consolidate the existing regime or undermine it; assist the advent of revolution or hamper it and benefit or harm progress in general, depending on their specific characteristic, the spirit in which they have been granted, and above all, the spirit in which they are asked for, claimed or seized by the people. (Malatesta, 1965: 81)

This distinction has also been employed by various others in relation to issues such as prison abolition (Gilmore, 2007: 183), ecosocialist transformation (Baer, 2017) and the generalised radicalisation of democratic institutions (Mouffe, 2018). The realist anarchist application of this approach will be outlined in more detail in the following section.

Secondly, realist anarchists endorse reforms that can have a direct effect on alleviating suffering and hardship. They argue that anarchist opposition to all forms of oppression demands support for efforts towards the effective amelioration of its effects, even if by means of reforms that originate from or are implemented by ultimately illegitimate institutions (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 472–473). This position also rejects the ‘worse is better’ stance of crude radicalism which accepts inaction against suffering in the hope that it will lead to a crisis that precipitates widespread revolution (Chomsky, 2005: 213). For realist anarchists then the directive that political thought should be ‘concrete, and oriented towards action’ counters radical theory focused on articulating alternative social models without considering their implementation, or which counsels inaction in anticipation of a prophesied perfect moment for enacting a total, final revolution. As we will see in the following section, these positions have particular relevance to the realist anarchist approach to managing the tension between extremely radical goals and realistic strategy and analysis.

The directive that we should recognise the importance of history, contingency and context in political thought (Baderin, 2014: 144; Rossi and Sleat, 2014: 7) also has particular radical interpretations and implications. The acceptance that ‘politics is historically located’ (Geuss, 2008: 13) might inspire recognition of moments of historical rupture – of reform, revolt and revolution – and serve as a reminder of the constancy of social change, the ubiquity of resistance against illegitimate authority and that society could be radically otherwise (Chomsky, 1996: 85–86). This perspective on historical contingency is also relevant to one of the most longstanding disagreements in revolutionary thought. Anarchists have long opposed the teleological view of history associated with orthodox Marxism, and contemporary anarchists especially reaffirm the contingency of historical processes, and that history does not unfold according to a predetermined schedule (Wigger, 2016: 134). For realist anarchists this means that radicals must act – they must recognise their agency in history and that there is nothing necessary about the currently dominant social, political and economic forms, nor anything inevitable about revolutionary change.

This action, however, must recognise and respond to context. Realist anarchists ‘cannot impose an iron-clad program or method on the future’ but must ‘leave posterity to develop its own particular systems, in harmony with its needs’ (Goldman, 1969: 49). There cannot be a single revolutionary strategy or utopian model that is generally applicable regardless of political, economic, historical and cultural contexts. Radical action and efforts towards social change must conform to particular, contingent requirements (Malatesta, 2014 [1924]b: 453). For those committed to radically democratic and generally emancipatory politics, this implies that the details of radical actions and organisational models that apply in particular contexts that action must conform to are not merely to be determined by elites, but by the democratic self-determination of the peoples within those contexts (Chomsky, 2005: 221–222; Turcato, 2015: 217–218). So for a realist anarchist the recognition of context also calls radicals to humility – to the acceptance that the detailed construction of universal models of (even radical) democracy by intellectual elites goes beyond the legitimate set of tasks that a radical political theorist can undertake.

One tenet within the recent re-articulation of realism in political theory might appear an insurmountable obstacle to the reconciliation of anarchist radicalism and the realist disposition. Both radical and liberal realists in the recent realist discourse argue against an ‘ethics-first’ approach to political theory (Geuss, 2008: 9; Williams, 2005). An ethics-first approach to political theory is described as the view that ‘politics is applied ethics’ – where a priori ethical principles are first determined and politics subsequently framed as the application of those principles. Those familiar with standard representations of anarchism would be forgiven for assuming that all forms of anarchism are based on just such an ethics-first approach. Anarchism is often defined as the application of the principle that all authority is illegitimate (e.g. Newman, 2015: 1–2). Many anarchists also advocate a purist application of this position which equates to the implementation of the implicit principle ‘never engage with, or endorse with cooperation, any illegitimate institution’ which is clearly a non-realist moralistic principle on the order of Kant’s ‘never lie even to save a life’ (Kant in Geuss, 2008: 8). This position is indeed prevalent in contemporary anarchism. It is associated with the stance suggested above by the non-realist perspectives that realist anarchist positions are often levelled against (i.e. the anarchist tendency which aims for a conflict-free utopia through universalist strategies that neglect considerations of power, history and context).

Realist anarchism, however, is not the application of a moral belief that all coercion is immoral or that all authority is illegitimate, nor does it proceed from an a priori moral principle of any kind. Instead, realist anarchism is based on a sceptical stance towards all authority based on a realist appreciation of one of the qualities that humans appear to exhibit across history and independent of culture. That is, that people generally do not seem to accept being controlled, dominated and oppressed, and history suggests that the attempt to do so will usually draw some form of resistance and, in time, be seen as an illegitimate form of authority. Rather than a moral or ethical principle, this is a realist observation much like that which sees humans as driven not only by rational calculation, and this insight is similarly derived from the interpretations of the central tenets of a realist disposition described above. Attention to history, the actual realities that drive people to political action, the ubiquity of resistance, struggle and change, lead realist anarchists to see it as a realistic and pragmatic stance to be sceptical towards all forms of authority11 (Chomsky, 1970: viii). Though they may seem similar, complete opposition is importantly distinct in its implications when compared with scepticism towards all forms of authority. Scepticism entails that the onus of proof should be placed on those that see unequal power relations as legitimate, and no form of authority should be considered immune from the requirement to justify its necessity on the terms of those subject to it. It also entails, however, the recognition that some forms of authority can indeed be accepted as legitimate, and beyond this, that even illegitimate institutions and practices can, under some circumstances, be considered relatively acceptable when compared with other currently available alternatives (Chomsky, 1996: 73–74).

This scepticism is levelled not at one form of authority, such as the state, but at all forms, and it is combined with a concrete, action-orientated realist perspective which, in its radical iteration, entails immediate opposition to oppression rather than awaiting a teleological unfolding of history or the idea that ‘the worse, the better’ for radical politics (Chomsky, 2005: 213). Therefore, the realist anarchist perspective recognises the unavoidable tension in radical positions which oppose various forms of illegitimate authority simultaneously. Rather than proceeding according to the application of a moralistic principle such as ‘never engage with an illegitimate institution’, the realist anarchist must compare and balance tensions between their oppositions to different forms of illegitimate authority according to the particular historical and political contexts. This weighing of relative priority between opposition to different forms of illegitimate authority, for example those associated with capitalism and the state, leads realist anarchists to perhaps their most controversial and challenged stance – a nuanced and pragmatic approach to the state. As noted, there are anarchists who advocate the complete withdrawal and disengagement from formal political institutions, and propose a future radical alternative based on absolutely no formal political structures. Realist anarchism is not one of these forms of radical thought. The nuanced realist anarchist stance towards political institutions and engagement with them is, as we will see in the next section, central to understanding realist anarchism as an actually-existing form of realism that is based on both an unflinchingly realistic attitude to political thought and action, as well as a far-reaching, utopian radicalism that calls for social change that appears, in current contexts, to be patently impossible.

Demanding the impossible while being realistic: Anarchism within the state

In my view, the state is an illegitimate institution. But it does not follow from that that you should not support the state. (Chomsky, 2005: 212)

While anarchism is sometimes portrayed as little more than an uncompromising opposition to the state (e.g. Wolff, 1970), a nuanced approach to the state is the most contentious element of the tendency that I have been referring to as realist anarchism. It is implicitly affirmed by some (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473; Shantz, 2010: 85–86), and explicitly but without emphasis by others (Gordon, 2007: 154–155). However, those who have openly and defiantly stated this position (Chomsky, 1996) or have been perceived as doing so (Bookchin, 1998) have courted denunciation and ‘excommunication’ by other anarchists.12 This approach to formal political institutions, and the state in particular, is drawn from a fairly obvious logical extrapolation of opposition to all forms of oppression including both the state and capitalism, and the insistence that oppression must be actively resisted rather than ignored in the hope that a teleological process will deliver emancipation. Simply then, the realist anarchist does not consider the state to be a legitimate institution, yet still holds that some actions of the state can be positive when they are directed at preventing a relatively greater oppression imposed by another form of illegitimate authority. The primary way that the realist anarchist argues that the state can sometimes be considered relatively legitimate (or at least a ‘lesser evil’) is in relation to the tension between opposing both contemporary capitalism and the state simultaneously. There are two main ways that realist anarchists argue this tension can lead to anarchist engagement with, and support for, the state: for protecting people from pressing negative social effects of capitalism (Rai, 2015: 180); and to reform current social, political and economic institutions in accordance with radical goals, or to position radical movements to move further towards radical goals in the most realistic manner possible (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]b: 433).

Anarchist involvement in local social organising has imbued the contemporary milieu with a keen awareness of the relatively positive effect of state-based social services considering the increase in suffering created by their withdrawal. Therefore, in recent decades under widespread neoliberal political and ideological hegemony, anarchists have often opposed privatisation of public services and other state-owned enterprises (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). Their sensitivity to social issues also leads many contemporary anarchist groups to enter into alliances with nonanarchist radical and non-radical community and activist groups, including single-issue reformist campaigns that call directly on the state for social provisions, in order to more effectively tackle issues of marginalisation, inequality and hardship (Gordon, 2007: 58–59). In fact, in the context of several decades of leftist retreat and defeat, including the privatisation of essential industries and social services, some anarchist organisations openly support re-nationalisation efforts (MacSimoin, 2007; Van Der Walt, 1996). Realist anarchists then prefer state control of means of production when the alternative is private ownership and, in the wake of decades of privatisation, support re-nationalisation as they see publiclyowned industries as more advantageous sites from which to agitate for direct worker control – a long-held anarchist organisational goal (Marshall, 2010: 7–9).

In contrast to the stereotypical depiction of anarchism, then, realist anarchists avoid simplistic slogans like ‘smashing the state’ and emphasise the replacement of illegitimate institutions rather than their simple destruction – ‘we must not destroy anything that satisfies human need, however badly – until we have something better to put in its place’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473). This position entails efforts towards the prefigurative construction of such alternatives, and indeed much of the energy of contemporary anarchist movements is dedicated to such efforts (see e.g. Shantz, 2010). However, it also recognises the relatively positive use of state power that many anarchists are reluctant to admit explicitly but that realist anarchists openly acknowledge (Bookchin, 1979: 29; Chomsky, 2002: 344; Gordon, 2007: 154). So, their recognition of the tension between opposing the oppression and suffering induced by capitalism while simultaneously opposing the state drives realist anarchists away from purist disengagement with the state and towards acceptance of the need to support reformist measures against oppression and suffering.

This engagement with the state is not only accepted in order to combat the social symptoms of capitalism in a passive form of harm-minimisation that has given up on the possibility of far-reaching radical social change, but it is also endorsed as a method to pursue such change. So while realist anarchists argue that state control of social services is preferable when the alternative is neoliberal privatisation and for-profit services, they also see a flawed but somewhat democratic state system as a better platform for achieving their revolutionary goals of social, political and economic re-organisation, including the long-term goal of state transformation and replacement, than a state weakened in its social and economic roles, and dominated by corporate capitalism (Chomsky, 2005: 213; Shantz, 2010: 86).

While realist anarchists, as anarchists, do not advocate establishing ‘anarchist parties’ or directly pursuing state control, they do recognise the pluralism of the radical milieu and accept that other radicals will indeed pursue party-based political control. However, when they can contribute to either diminishing a currently pressing form of oppression, delivering ‘radical reforms’ or positioning radical movements for further gains, realist anarchists advocate supporting radical party-based efforts (Malatesta, [2014 [1924]a: 420, 426–427). Therefore, realist anarchist recognition of the tension between radical opposition to intersecting and even competing forms of oppression extends to support for an activity usually considered wholly contrary to the anarchist position: engagement with representative electoral politics through voting (Chomsky, 2005: 241; Gordon, 2007: 120). This does not mean, however, that realist anarchists forego their opposition to the state. They maintain their philosophical objection to, and rejection of, the state, and also maintain the seemingly impossible demand for its replacement as the primary unit of large-scale political organisation.

Despite this uncompromised goal, however, realist anarchists recognise the need to engage with current political realities, such as dominant institutions, in pursuit of radical change. Therefore, they attempt to devise strategies that can employ the state in efforts towards its own replacement with alternate forms of democratic organisation (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). These strategies, of course, are not universal but conform to contingent and particular political, historical, and cultural contexts. For example, a revolutionary movement in ‘Rojava’, Northern Syria, is currently pursuing one such strategy in the midst of the Syrian civil war.13 The revolutionary reorganisation of the Middle East called ‘democratic confederalism’ proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (Partiya € Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ – Kurdistan Workers’ Party), is an adaptation of the anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin’s14 approach to radical strategy (Biehl, 2015: 315–317). Ocalan argues that radical movements in the Middle East should organise into federated autonomous enclaves within the shells of already internationally recognised nation-states, and use the legislative and constitutive power of the state to ratify and legalise these federated structures of radically democratic, feminist and eco-socialist enclaves (Stanchev, 2016). In the long term, the strategy aims towards the expansion of this model to neighbouring states, at which point these allied national federated structures could further integrate into a regional bloc of democratic self-organisation that has replaced the state form (Ocalan, 2011).

Other strategies are suggested in other contexts. Chomsky, for instance, advocates a democratic approach to radical change, in part due to his appraisal that modern western societies have such overwhelmingly powerful and violently repressive state apparatuses that armed revolution is not a realistic strategy within them (Chomsky in Rai, 2015: 177). Instead, he endorses Andre´ Gorz’s ‘non-reformist reform’ approach in which certain reforms are considered potential paths to further radical change (Edgley, 2015: 8). The implementation of workplace and/or community democracy through direct action at the site in question, combined with support from democratic legislative and constitutional control, is given as an example of non-reformist reform (Gorz, 1967: 8n, 60–62). Realist anarchists see this approach as capable of being extended further, to the radicalisation and democratisation of the institutions of democratic organisation and decisionmaking, to the point where the state is democratically transformed into some other form of large-scale political entity15 (Chomsky, 1996: 75). Realist anarchists do not see this as a short-term strategy that can be achieved in a single step, and neither do they suggest that it could or should be accomplished by anarchists alone (realist or otherwise), but by a broad, diverse, radical milieu with largely shared goals. Within such a ‘movement of movements’, constituted by a respect for internal difference and disagreement, realist anarchists can advance their case for a realistic democratic strategy for the achievement of radical ends (Gordon, 2007: 59; Malatesta,2014 [1925]b: 466–467).

These are obviously not direct and immediate, or guaranteed, paths to an anarchist future, and that is the point. Realist anarchists do not hold to a detailed vision of a particular radical alternative, nor to one particular strategy to achieve it, but instead move as realistically as possible from current conditions towards a seemingly impossible radical goal that by necessity must become fully defined in its realisation (Rai, 2015: 179). So, in contrast with the stereotypical image of anarchist destruction of the state, realist anarchists wish to replace the state through its radical democratisation, supported, ratified and generalised by democratic control of the state and its re-constitutive powers. Therefore, rather than the typical pessimism associated with realism, realist anarchism implies a comparatively optimistic stance towards the possibility of radical change. And in contrast to the pessimism suggested by radicals who maintain their ideological purity through inaction and uncompromising disengagement, realist anarchists are optimistic enough about the possibility of actually achieving seemingly impossible radical goals that they endeavour to be realistic about what it would take to move towards those goals from current conditions.

#### Empirics verify the value of institutional engagement.

Patricia H. Collins 09, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, “Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment.” page 277-280 https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-though-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf

Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women

The structural domain of power encompasses how social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights. These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation—by race, class, and gender—to produce these unjust results. For AfricanAmerican women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women from exercising full citizenship rights. Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods poorly served by social services, to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools, or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude. Within the structural domain of power, empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion. Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time via interconnected social institutions, segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight. Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change, remains more the exception than the rule. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves, typically through social reforms, constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain. Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws, Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation. African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed. Grassroots organizations, forming national advocacy organizations, and event-specific social protest such as boycotts and sit-ins have all been used, yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change. Even the development of parallel social institutions such as Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women. While necessary, these legal victories may not be enough. Ironically, the same laws designed to protect African-American women from social exclusion have increasingly become used against Black women. In describing new models for equal treatment under the law, Black feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw argues that the rhetoric of color-blindness was not unseated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Instead, the rhetoric of color-blindness was reformulated to refer to the equal treatment of individuals by not discriminating among them. Under this new rhetoric of color-blindness, equality meant treating all individuals the same, regardless of differences they brought with them due to the effects of past discrimination or even discrimination in other venues. “Having determined, then, that everyone was equal in the sense that everyone had a skin color,” observes Crenshaw, “symmetrical treatment was satisfied by a general rule that nobody’s skin color should be taken into account in governmental decision-making” (Crenshaw 1997, 284). Within this logic, the path to equality lies in ignoring race, gender, and other markers of historical discrimination that might account for any differences that individuals bring to schools and the workplace. As a new rule that maintains long-standing hierarchies of race, class, and gender while appearing to provide equal treatment, this rhetoric of color-blindness has had some noteworthy effects. For one, observes Black feminist legal scholar Patricia Williams (1995), it fosters a certain kind of race thinking among Whites: Because the legal system has now formally equalized individual access to housing, schooling, and jobs, any unequal group results, such as those that characterize gaps between Blacks and Whites, must somehow lie within the individuals themselves or their culture. When joined to its twin of gender neutrality, one claiming that no significant differences distinguish men from women, the rhetoric of color-blindness works to unseat one important strategy of Black women’s resistance within the structural domain. Black women who make claims of discrimination and who demand that policies and procedures may not be as fair as they seem can more easily be dismissed as complainers who want special, unearned favors. Moreover, within a rhetoric of color-blindness that defends the theme of no inherent differences among races, or of gender-neutrality that claims no differences among genders, it becomes difficult to talk of racial and gender differences that stem from discriminatory treatment. The assumption is that the U.S. matrix of domination now provides equal treatment because where it once overtly discriminated by race and gender, it now seemingly ignores them. Beliefs such as these thus allow Whites and men to support a host of punitive policies that reinscribe social heirarchies of race and gender. In her discussion of how racism now relies on encoded language Angela Davis identifies how this rhetoric of color-blindness can operate as a form of “camouflaged racism”: Because race is ostracized from some of the most impassioned political debates of this period, their racialized character becomes increasingly difficult to identify, especially by those who are unable—or do not want— to decipher the encoded language. This means that hidden racist arguments can be mobilized readily across racial boundaries and political alignments. Political positions once easily defined as conservative, liberal, and sometimes even radical therefore have a tendency to lose their dis tinctiveness in the face of the seductions of this camouflaged racism (Davis 1997, 264). Americans can talk of “street crime” and “welfare mothers,” all the while claiming that they are not discussing race at all. Despite the new challenges raised by the rhetoric of color-blindness and gender neutrality, it is important to remember that legal strategies have yielded and most probably will continue to produce victories for African-American women. Historically, much of Black women’s resistance to the policies and procedures of the structural domain of power occurred outside powerful social institutions. Currently, however, African-American women are more often included in these same social institutions that long excluded us. Increasing numbers of African-American women have gained access to higher education, now hold good jobs, and might be considered middle-class if not elite. These women often occupy positions of authority inside schools, corporations, and government agencies. Achieving these results required changing U.S. laws.

#### Pragmatic action within coalitions best address racial violence.

Patricia H. Collins 17, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, "On violence, intersectionality and transversal politics," Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 40, 2017 - Issue 9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2017.1317827

Towards transversal politics: flexible solidarity and coalition building When I wrote “The Tie That Binds”, I hoped that developing intersectionality’s theoretical contours might contribute to ameliorating violence as a social problem. Yet intersectional analyses, on their own, are unlikely to yield more effective political solutions to violence. Analysis is important, yet action also matters. Because “thinking” one’s way out of domination is unrealistic, I now ask, how might more sophisticated analyses of power that take into account the ties linking violence, intersecting oppressions and domination facilitate more robust analyses of political resistance? In “The Tie That Binds”, I discussed transversal politics as a form of political engagement that had important implications for understanding organized political resistance. Here I return to that argument via a brief discussion of solidarity and coalition-building. The responses of African American women and similarly historically subordinated groups to intersecting oppressions illuminates the nature of political domination as well the transversal politics it might engender. For example, African American women’s intellectual and political traditions raise some provocative questions concerning the nature of political solidarity. The trajectory of Black feminism within African American communities suggests that Black women’s responses to racial violence moved beyond racial solidarity that was centred exclusively on racism. Black feminist agendas regarding gender and sexuality existed much earlier than when they became visible to a broader public. The story of how Black feminism’s analyses of gender and sexuality advanced intersectional arguments is well-known. Yet the ways in which Black feminist understandings of political solidarity may have been shaped by intersectional analyses remains less familiar. In my recent work, I have returned to issues of political solidarity and coalition politics within African American women’s history (see e.g. Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s experiences with violence provide guidance, not as a universal case for oppressed groups, but rather as a catalyst for theoretical insight concerning the interconnections of domination and resistance. Because contemporary forms of violence visited upon African American women have become so routinized in U.S. social institutions and normalized within public hate speech, it is easy to overlook the centrality of violence to the origins and history of African Americans as a U.S. population group. African Americans became Black people in the context of a forced migration within global capitalist expansion, the differential exploitation of productive and reproductive labour of men and women during slavery, and the subsequent structural disadvantages have shaped African American life. Ghettoization and racial segregation were key to African American domination in the U.S. context. Persistent high levels of residential, educational and employment segregation in the U.S. constitute fundamental structural features that contribute to racial hierarchy. Violence was essential to forming Black people as a population as well as the shared meanings that were associated with this political Blackness. For African American women, these social conditions catalysed a particular form of politics, one characterized on the one hand by a stance of dissemblance from the external world whereby Black women hid the harm they experienced from rape, abuse and forms sexual violence (Hine 1989); and on the other hand, a distinctive Black feminist politics that reflected Black women’s analyses and actions in response to the ever-present threat of violence. As a collectively, Black women in the U.S. could not ignore how anti-Black hate speech and routinized racial violence took gender-specific forms. In this social context, Black women developed a more strategic, dynamic and sophisticated approach to solidarity that refutes understandings of solidarity as ideological uniformity that, within African American communities, took patriarchal and homophobic forms. Yet many Black feminist intellectual-activists never fully accepted this kind of group-think that define solidarity through the ideological lens of a homogeneous blackness that privileged masculinity and heterosexuality. Instead, Black women were more likely to see the ways in which they were simultaneously in solidarity with Black men regarding racism as well as the ways in which such solidarity was problematic regarding sexism and homophobia. Historically, Black women intellectual-activists developed forms of political action that were characterized by a flexible solidarity, one where alliances within African American communities have been grounded in ongoing relationships of compromise and contestation (Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s community work in particular fostered a commitment to Black solidarity as a core feature of African American women’s political engagement both within and on behalf of Black communities (Collins 2006, 123–160). Without solidarity among African Americans, political struggles to upend racial domination were doomed. Yet for Black women, an unquestioned solidarity could be neither inherently desirable nor effective when it rested on male-dominated, intergenerational gender hierarchies. Such solidarity was hierarchical, rigid, often backed up by religious theology or tradition, and created roadblocks for effective political action. Black women saw the need for solidarity, yet calibrated their ideas and actions to hone critical understandings of solidarity that were better suited for specific political projects, for example, opposing both lynching and rape because they were interconnected practices of violence. Solidarity was not an essentialist category, a bundle of rules that was blindly applied across time and space. Instead, a flexible understanding of solidarity enabled African American women to work with the concept, moulding it to the particular challenges at hand. Working within African American organizations often sensitized Black women to inequalities of gender and sexuality within African American communities as well as within broader society. This awareness catalysed a deepening analysis of intersectionality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, these intellectual and political understandings of solidarity were also worked out over time, primarily through everyday, organized political behaviour within African American communities. Stated differently, sustaining political vigilance in the face of racism required being attuned to the political implications both of ideology and strategy. This idea of flexible solidarity within Black feminism lays a foundation for the kind of elasticity that Nira Yuval-Davis assigns to transversal politics (Yuval-Davis 1997, 125–132). Drawing on the work of Italian feminists, Yuval-Davis concludes her book Gender and Nation with a section sketching out several political and intellectual projects that seem to point toward a transversal politics. Rereading Yuval-Davis’s arguments, especially in light of the shifting interpretive climate of hate speech, the more visible connections between hate speech and actions, and the scope of routinized violence, suggests that revisiting the main ideas of transversal politics may be especially constructive. Several points stand out that merit review. For one, Yuval-Davis eschews understandings of groups that are based solely on self-chosen identities or identifications. Instead, she focuses on the authority of nation-states in creating and reproducing historically constituted, socially stratified population groups. She notes, “the boundaries of the groupings were determined not by an essentialist notion of difference, but by a concrete and material political reality” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 129). In the 1980s and into the 1990s, an emerging feminist literature on intersectionality engaged nationalism, examining topics such as how the public policies of nation-states were inherently intersectional, how the national identities of various nation-states relied on intersecting systems of power, and how differential citizenship rights underlay social inequalities (see e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Scholars in the 1990s seemingly moved away from the literature on nation-states and nationalism, especially its emphasis on the structures of state power. Rereading Yuval Davis in the aftermath of this discursive turn shows how she places far more emphasis on historically constituted groups and the opportunities and constraints they bring to coalition politics than contemporary emphases on individuals and their rights. Bringing groups back into analysis creates space to analyse inter-group politics. Yuval-Davis describes the structured yet dynamic sense of coalitions as being “rooted” in a particular social context but also “shifting” in order to engage in transversal dialogues and politics. Yuval-Davis’s depiction of transversal politics requires processes of shifting that do not mean losing one’s own rooting within historically situated communities and the intellectual and political sensibilities that rooting engenders. In this sense, ideas about intersectionality and flexibility that Black women develop within African American communities need not be jettisoned when shifting toward transversal politics. Far from one of subordinating one’s issues into some greater good, as suggested within prevailing understandings of solidarity, remaining rooted while shifting constitutes a viable if not essential political option. Another dimension of shifting is equally significant: the process of shifting must maintain the multiplicity of perspectives both within a group and across groups. This is the difficult challenge, one that recognizes that some coalitions may not be possible. My reading of the historical trajectory of Black feminism in the U.S. is that the flexible solidarity that Black women exhibit across many historical periods, and that informs intersectionality, constitute a missing dimension of transversal politics. Instead, the flexible solidarity by Black women within African American communities, when coupled with Yuval Davis’s framework of the rooting and shifting of transversal politics, potentially facilitates thinking through coalition politics within a context of intersecting power relations. How might the concept of flexible solidarity honed through Black women’s politics within African American communities and the idea of transversal politics as a framework for coalitions among groups inform anti-violence initiatives? Flexible solidarity and transversal politics remain abstract, and some might argue, unrealistic aspirational constructs. One construct seems wedded to past practices (flexible solidarity) whereas the other points toward an as yet unrealized future (transversal politics). Perhaps, however, both constructs inform contemporary anti-violence initiatives. Take, for example, the effective political mobilization of the Black Lives Matter movement against state-sanctioned violence (Cobb 2016). This movement illustrates how the ideas of intersectionality and flexible solidarity honed within Black feminism suggest a move toward transversal politics as a way to resist violence. Initially led by three queer African American women who created the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, the stellar growth of Black Lives Matter from 2012 to 2016 illustrates how the legacy of Black feminism has been brought to bear on the contemporary social problem of state-sanctioned racial violence. The deaths of several young African American men, widely shared on social media, was the spark that catalysed the movement. Yet Black women have been visible within the Black Lives Matter movement, from the initial leadership of the movement, to the large numbers Black women participating in the protests, demonstrations and urban rebellions that sustained the vitality of the movement. In essence, Black women who catalysed this movement drew upon the legacy of a Black feminism’s long history of resisting violence targeted toward Black people. At its inception, the Black Lives Matter movement also invoked the idea of intersectionality to expand the categories of Black people who should be respected by the movement. Historically, Black women themselves had used the idea of flexible solidarity to choose strategic moments to broaden Black solidarity to address issues of gender. The initial hashtag #BlackLivesMatter expressed a similar deepening of an intersectional analysis of Blackness, now expanded to highlight the issues of groups that were historically subordinated within Black communities. The web site of the Black Lives Matter movement has undergone substantial updating as the organization has grown, yet the initial intersectional description of their mission has remained constant: Rooted in the experiences of Black people in this country who actively resist our dehumanization, #BlackLivesMatter is a call to action and a response to the virulent anti-Black racism that permeates our society. Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes … Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movement. (blacklivesmatter.com) The movement as laid out by the founders of #BlackLivesMatter is clearly intersectional by highlighting how all Black individuals within Black communities were worthy of political protection. Their intersectional mandate deepens analysis of how different sub-groups within Black communities experience racial domination. It is rooted in a collective Black past, yet not one that is uncritically celebrated or that mandates knee-jerk adherence to solidarity. Significantly, as the movement has grown, its organizational practices also illustrate the goal of drawing upon flexible solidarity to strengthen both its own organizational capacities as a political community as well as those of other Black political communities. As the movement has evolved, it rejected the hierarchical bureaucracies of traditional civil rights organizations in favour of a more fluid decentralized organizational structure that allows it to draw upon the flexibility of networks. This focus on flexible coalitions within a Black movement sets the stage for potential coalitions with external groups. In this sense, Black Lives Matter remains rooted in its anti-violence project, yet embraces a form of flexible solidarity within its practices that sees coalitions as always under construction and not as ideologically fixed. This orientation positions it to remain rooted in the needs of its own praxis. Black Lives Matter points to the necessary interconnectedness of intersectionality and flexible solidarity within its own praxis as well as the continued challenges of using these ideas within broader social movements. This example also signals the challenges of future coalition building with other groups that have been inspired by this movement, yet must find ways to bring more sophisticated understandings of their own group histories to the transversal politics that might ensue. Developing more complex analyses of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis that resists violence promises to be a long-term intellectual and political project. Because violence is so deeply embedded into the fabric of society, it is unlikely to yield to the efforts of any one theory or group of social actors. Yet just as intersecting oppressions are far from static, forms of political resistance that are similarly flexible are well-positioned for such sustained intellectual and political struggle. In this endeavour, continuing to focus on violence should illuminate new connections between intersecting systems of power and on new possibilities for political resistance.

#### Reject a totalizing conception of competition.

Sanjukta Paul 22, Assistant Professor, Law, Wayne State University, "A Democratic Vision for Antitrust," Dissent, Vol. 69, No. 1, Winter 2022, Project Muse.

Last spring, prominent Big Tech critic Lina Khan became the new chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—;an appointment widely seen as a coup for progressive reform. In her confirmation hearing, she characterized the agency's overarching goal in terms of "fair competition." This choice of emphasis is significant for understanding the antitrust reform project of which Khan is a leader. At its core, the project is a policy paradigm aimed at creating fair markets—;markets characterized by socially beneficial competition, fair prices, and decent wages.

While both proponents and detractors of this reform project sometimes conflate competition policy with the goal of maximizing economic competition for its own sake, in reality, competition law has always assessed economic rivalry and coordination in relation to broader social ends. For a long time, that assessment has been obscured—;not to mention insufficiently tethered to the original goals of federal antitrust law. The reform project aims to reorient the use of antitrust in expressly egalitarian and democratic directions.

For decades, competition law and policy have been dominated by the neoclassical law and economics paradigm, which claims that visible market design and coordination interfere with competitive dynamics that would otherwise lead to an efficient allocation of social resources, and thus to the maximization of social welfare. While recent shifts in mainstream economic thinking have led to more discussion of imperfect competition, particularly in labor markets, the "market failures" and power imbalances that justify interventions are on this view still essentially special cases. Moreover, this idealized picture of markets still obscures certain forms of background coordination—;especially the often hierarchical and extractive coordination that happens within business firms—;while treating other coordination mechanisms as exceptional, with the potential to distort ideal market outcomes.

Conventionally organized business firms are just one of the many means we have to coordinate economic activity; others include labor [End Page 57] unions, producers' cooperatives, and public price boards, to take just a few examples. Because competition law makes ground-up decisions about many forms of economic coordination, and influences the regulatory stance toward others, antitrust reforms hold the potential to affect a broad set of economic policies.

We should not act as if putatively neutral, technocratic appeals to idealized competition can replace moral and political choices

<<MARKED>>

about economic life. Nor, however, should we treat actual competition as inherently tainted by its association with neoclassical theory. Channeled appropriately, competition is healthy rivalry: it encourages technological and operational innovations that can have broad social benefits, and it represents an important check on arbitrary bureaucratic power by preserving outside options for workers, consumers, and businesses. Channeled inappropriately, competition can lead to the destructive undermining of rivals (in contrast to constructive outperformance), overwhelm socially valuable independent enterprises, and destroy existing market settlements characterized by fair prices and decent wages. There is no universal logic of competition for policymakers to apply, either dark or redemptive: it is legal, social, and political choices (almost) all the way down.

# 2NC

## T-USFG

### Topical Access---2NC

#### Searching for interdisciplinary overlap creates the best debates.

Rick Szostak 17, Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Alberta, Ph.D. from Northwestern University, “Interdisciplinary Research as a Creative Design Process,” from *Creativity, Design Thinking and Interdisciplinarity*, pp. 17-33, Springer, 2017

One element of creativity deserves emphasis here: Creative solutions are to at least some extent “surprising.” The ideas that are the most surprising—but also useful— will generally be judged the most creative. There is an important trade-off here, then, between looking where relevant information is most likely and looking where surprising connections are most likely. The advice we give to students—to identify the most relevant disciplines to their research question—is surely valid. But more advanced scholars should recognize that they are more likely to make a surprising connection by looking in less obvious places. A discipline with only a tangential interest in the problem at hand may hold a critical insight into its solution. Moreover, the greater the range of insights—and thus combinations—that one identifies, the more likely one is to be creative (Wong & Siu, 2012).

How do you identify possible surprises? One strategy involves brainstorming the broader context of the problem. One should start out by being open to seemingly crazy ideas. Those ideas that seem like they might have some merit may guide researchers to look in disciplines that would otherwise escape their attention. Brainstorming can thus be contrasted with a more rational identification of the most likely influences.

Literature Search

It should be noted that our present state of “information overload” can itself be a barrier to creativity. McGuinness (2011) worries that some shy away from searching for relevant information because of a sense that there is simply too much. Yet there are at least three distinct literatures in the field of information science— literature-based discovery, undiscovered public knowledge, and serendipity—that each recognize that important scholarly discoveries often come from juxtaposing distinct ideas from different scholarly fields. Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas (2016) discuss how systems of knowledge organization could be changed in order to enhance such juxtapositions in particular and interdisciplinary research more generally; they also provide much insight along the way into the structure of existing systems and how these might be navigated. The interdisciplinary researcher should appreciate that locating the right set of literature—that is connected but in a way that nobody has appreciated—is an important source of creative insights. They should also appreciate that our present systems of library classification do not make it easy to locate distinct but related literatures. The researcher thus needs to reflect deeply on just what sorts of related information might be useful and where they might be hiding.

Evaluating Insights

The IRP provides several strategies for evaluating disciplinary insights—the conclusions generated in disciplinary research—before these can be integrated into a novel and more comprehensive understanding. The strategy with the greatest implication for creativity involves asking of each insight what is left out: What variables, theories, or methods addressed by other disciplines were excluded from view as this insight was developed? (Note that we capture here elements of “What if?” and “Why not?”). Such a strategy guides the researcher to identify connections that are missed in the existing literature

Again we face a trade-off. We might identify a variable studied by sociologists that fairly obviously deserves attention in a theory posited by economists. We might identify other phenomena whose importance is less obvious. We can make a useful contribution to scholarly understanding by focusing only on the first type of omission—and a contribution that is novel and useful and thus creative. But we may be able to produce a far more creative insight if we reflect a bit more on those phenomena whose importance is less obvious. We are trying to give our subconscious processes a range of possibilities to play with and should be careful not to exclude possibilities that our subconscious may find useful. Creativity necessarily embraces complexity.

Repko and Szostak (2016) provide tables of phenomena studied in various disciplines, types of theories applied, and methods applied. These tables are generally employed in a very conscious process of identifying the most relevant phenomena, theories, and methods. Their role in stimulating creativity deserves also to be highlighted: They potentially provide the subconscious with a broad set of possible connections. The goal for the creative researcher, then, is to look through such tables not just for the obviously relevant items but the “just might be relevant” items. Some may imagine a conflict between the structure of detailed and fairly exhaustive classification and the freedom associated with creativity, but structure can set the stage for novelty.

Note that we do not throw away an insight simply because it has limitations. Rather we ask if other insights can perhaps address these limitations. Again this process will sometimes be straightforward. At other times it will be less obvious how a limitation can be addressed. This situation also becomes grist for our subconscious. In engineering, the Pugh Method involves employing creative thinking to suggest how flaws in various designs might be addressed in order to identify the optimal design. Engineers, it might be noted, do not seek perfection, but recognize that there will be imperfections in any design. In interdisciplinarity, as in design, we need to embrace the idea of ever-better solutions to challenges as we build on previous understandings.

Last but not least, we should be open to surprises. When we encounter a piece of information that is surprising we should carefully examine why this is so. SuperGlue was discovered by accident while researchers were pursuing a quite different project. Many on the research team saw this unexpected stickiness as a problem, but their supervisor recognized that they had a solution to a quite different problem (a recognition, it might be noted, fueled by a breadth of interest and knowledge). We should be willing to let surprises carry us in new directions. In the case of SuperGlue, an entirely new research question was generated (Darbellay, Moody, Sedooka, & Steffen, 2014). Surprises are a regular feature of research and have historically triggered many creative acts (Darbellay et al. mention also Post-it notes, Viagra, and Velcro), but we need to consciously (or subconsciously; see below) appreciate their importance.

Mapping

The IRP recommends visually mapping the connections among phenomena that appear relevant to the research question. This exercise aids the researcher in clarifying insights and in identifying connections not only among phenomena but among disciplines, theories, and methods. Such an exercise in visualization likely also encourages creativity. Creative insights generally emerge in the form of imagery: We picture our creative solution in some way (Spooner, 2004), likely because our subconscious operates sublingually. Images are still important as our conscious mind develops the creative insight: «We have re-defined design as being the process of composing a desirable figure toward the future» (Taura & Nagai, 2010, p. 8). If we accept that creative insights are generally visual (and always abstract and symbolic), then it makes sense to prepare our mind visually to achieve these.

How detailed should we get in our mapping? Yet again there is a trade-off between including only those phenomena that seem of great importance to the problem at hand versus attempting a much broader coverage. The literature on engineering design suggests a fairly broad coverage so that potential side-effects of a design are more readily appreciated.

Buzan (2010) has studied creative thinkers across many societies. He recommends a process called mind mapping, where the focal question/problem is placed in the middle of a piece of paper and connections are made to main ideas and thence to subsidiary ideas. Buzan’s mind map is similar to the maps recommended in the IRP—though the concepts placed on it need not be variables: We could thus add the theories and methods identified above, and any concepts uncovered in our research. But his purpose is different: to fire the imagination. Given that creative ideas are (generally) combinations of previous but unconnected ideas, if we place a set of relevant ideas on a piece of paper and then “free-think” about possible connections among them, we greatly enhance the possibility of a creative breakthrough. Buzan recommends using different colors or symbols to identify connections. Even on the sort of map currently recommended in the IRP one could usefully contemplate connections among variables not seemingly related. But Buzan urges us toward a “messier” map where we place every seemingly relevant idea on the same piece of paper, let our subconscious view the whole, and set the stage for the discovery of novel connections.

Mind mapping is intended as an exercise that links conscious and subconscious processes. Studies have shown that multiple parts of the brain are working when contemplating a mind map. The mind consciously identifies the concepts that are placed on the paper. The subconscious then takes them in as a whole and can imagine novel connections. The idea is to not over-structure the diagram but let the brain structure it. As Sill says of creativity in general, “Creativity is found in the human ability to move beyond existing patterns to restructure the patterns themselves, and, as a result, to make a more sophisticated game” (1996, p. 296).

If our task is to restructure existing patterns then it may be invaluable to recognize the stability-enhancing patterns at the heart of each discipline, such as equilibrium between supply and demand in markets in economics, a supportive set of cultural attitudes toward social stratification in sociology, schemas that allow individuals to navigate daily life in psychology, rules of atomic attraction in physics or chemical reactions in chemistry. Such disciplinary systems may of course allow for some types of predictable but manageable change. Interdisciplinary linkages may be part of a wider systemic stability (as when cultural attitudes accept a certain degree of economic inequality) but are often the sources of change as when household technology and new service sector occupations encouraged changes in attitudes toward gender. The implication here is that these stability-enhancing disciplinary patterns should be an important component of our understanding of disciplinary perspective, and interdisciplinary researchers should appreciate that interdisciplinary understandings will often disrupt discipline-level conceptions of stability (see Szostak, 2017).

## Market Metaphor K

# 1NR

## Racial Capitalism PIK

### AT: Turn

#### It is inaccurate.

Michael Walzer 20, Editor Emeritus, Dissent, "A Note on Racial Capitalism," Dissent Magazine, 07/29/2020, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online\_articles/a-note-on-racial-capitalism.

I have been puzzled for many months by the appearance of the phrase “racial capitalism” in the left press (see, for example, the article by K. Sabeel Rahman in the Summer 2020 issue of Dissent). What does it mean?

Perhaps the adjective “racial” is simply an ordinary qualifying adjective. Racial capitalism is one kind of capitalism, and then there must be other kinds, requiring other adjectives. Here in the United States we have a kind of capitalism where the majority of exploited workers or a majority of the most exploited workers are people of color. The underclass and the reserve army are defined both racially and economically. Of course, no leftist writer would be indifferent to the exploitation of white workers, who might still make up the majority of the American workforce—and who are certainly the majority of exploited workers in Europe. The point of the adjective, then, is simply to focus our attention, for good reasons, on non-white workers. But is the exploitation of these workers a necessary feature of American capitalism?

The phrase “racial capitalism” leaves us unclear about whether the hierarchical location of non-white workers is determined by race or by capitalism or by the two somehow working together. To begin to answer that question, we need to look at some examples of non-racial capitalism.

The form of capitalism sponsored by the Chinese communists is obviously non-racial. Though the exploited workers are, in Western terminology, people of color, Western terminology is out of place here. If the Chinese imported white workers to take on the most menial jobs, that might make Chinese capitalism “racial,” but no such importations have been reported. The predatory version of capitalism that prevails in Putin’s Russia is also non-racial. It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia, but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group. But no one is doing that. I have no statistics, but from what I read about China and Russia, I doubt that the rate of exploitation is higher in the United Sxtates, in racial capitalism, than it is in those two countries, where capitalism is non-racial. Capitalism “works” with and without a racialized underclass and reserve army.

But is that right? The adjective “racial” sometimes makes a much stronger claim: it isn’t a qualifying but rather a definitional adjective. Capitalism is necessarily, inherently, racist. Forget about China and Russia, which are capitalist latecomers. Western capitalism is the prototypical version, and it has been racist from day one (if we can agree on day one)—always and forever racist. Does this mean that Manchester in 1844, as Engels described it, where all the exploited workers were white, wasn’t capitalist? No, for those workers were producing fabrics from cotton raised and harvested by Black slaves in the American South.

That’s true enough, but I am not sure it is sufficient for an argument about necessity. Consider a counterfactual possibility: had no Black slaves been available, the recruitment of Irish workers would have started much earlier than it did. The rise of capitalism would not have been halted had the slave trade never begun.

But the Manchester/Southern plantation example suggests what we all now know: capitalism is a global economic system, and it depends on the exploitation of people of color around the world. Here, however, it seems clear that the key issue is exploitation, not racism. Given global demography, the majority of workers in any global economy will be people of color. Even in a democratically or social democratically regulated global system, the majority of workers and the majority of managers—the underclass and the overclass—will be non-white. Indeed, it would be the refusal of any transnational corporation to hire people of color that would rightly be called racist. (In the Pennsylvania town where I grew up, the local steel company did not hire, and therefore did not exploit, Jews or Black people. I suppose that this is also an example of racial capitalism.)

All this suggests that capitalism and racism have to be analyzed separately. They overlap sometimes, as they do today in the United States. But the overlap is circumstantial, not necessary. The two phenomena are distinct. They don’t rise and fall together. Each one, for different reasons, requires severe criticism and sustained opposition. Many years ago, socialist writers argued that the triumph of the working class would liberate women, Jews, Black people, and everyone else. Separate political struggles against sexism, anti-Semitism, or racism were unnecessary—indeed they were a distraction from the all-important class war. Today some people on the left seem to believe that the end of racism will bring with it the downfall of capitalism. Both these theories are wrong.

Overthrowing racism will still leave us with capitalism; overthrowing capitalism will still leave us with racism. Putting the adjective and noun together gives us a false sense of the relationship between the two phenomena.

## Case

### Mutual Aid Bad---1NR

#### Mutual aid solidifies neoliberalism and state-centricity---instead of challenging structural forces, it fills gaps in the system, allowing it to run more smoothly without foundational change.

Rhiannon Firth 20, Senior Research Officer in Sociology at the University of Essex, “Mutual Aid, Anarchist Preparedness and COVID-19”, Coronavirus, Class and Mutual Aid in the United Kingdom, Ed. Reston and Firth, p. 74-79

Dean Spade (2020: 136) argues that resistant left movements model three kinds of action that directly change material conditions: ‘(a) work to dismantle harmful systems … (b) work to directly provide for people targeted by such systems … and (c) work to build an alternative infrastructure through which people can get their needs met’. Mutual aid addresses (b) but as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders. In what follows, I will consider some of the actions that anarchists have undertaken during the COVID-19 crisis that address Spade’s criteria (a) and (c), whilst adding a fourth practice, which is not often covered under the rubric of action but ought to be: (d) publishing critique—in particular, I focus on anarchist critiques of securitisation and policing in the COVID-19 crisis, and anarchist critiques of capitalism. The publishing of propaganda and critique has a long and often hidden history in anarchist movement practice (Hoyt 2014; Ferretti 2017) and it is important because it helps to raise awareness of, and identify targets for, the other modes of action. Anarchist critiques during the COVID-19 crisis have largely been online, on blogs and social media, but also through word-of-mouth and exemplary actions while engaging in mutual aid with communities.

In London, the mutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care. There is a mutual aid group for each local borough, and these are divided by borough, zone and neighbourhood. There are also some London-wide networks and groups that co-ordinate or provide forums for people with specific interests, for example a Radical Assembly which provides a forum for radical left-wing and anarchist organisers, many of whom are dissatisfied with the lack of politicisation in their local ward. Local groups are composed of local community members helping others who are more vulnerable or who need to self-isolate to avoid spreading illness with tasks such as picking up and delivering groceries, medicines and other essentials, offering transportation to medical facilities, offering donations such as cleaning supplies, medical supplies and food for out-of-work people, offering home cooked meals, home/apartment cleaning, offering phonecalls, video chats and companionship, online entertainment such as yoga or dance classes, advice and advocacy navigating services, child care and pet care. Anarchists have also been involved in direct actions such as making masks, sewing scrubs and garnering donations of PPE for medical professionals. Similar to Occupy Sandy, these groups are utilising open source and internet technology, including Google docs with listing of groups, and being used by groups to organise resources, crowd-sourced lists of activities and initiatives, resource guides, webinars, slack channels, online meetups, peer-to-peer loan programmes and other forms of mutual aid emerging online and on-the-ground (Raymond 2020).

The mainstream perspective on disaster relief in general, and the coronavirus epidemic in particular, assumes that humans are selfish and competitive and are in need of a co-ordinating authority to tell them what to do. Mutual aid turns the conservative idea of the ‘disaster utopia’ on its head, positing that it is not a momentary suspension of division that leads communities to unite in mutual aid, but that this illustrates an alternative lifeworld that is normally hindered by the minorities in power and by media hegemonies (Solnit 2010: 8–9).

An interesting perspective on the current crisis is that Kropotkin’s original treatise on mutual aid was in large partly a critique of the then-fashionable ‘social Darwinism’ of the anarchist’s conservative contemporaries. Kropotkin’s idea that co-operation helps species thrive more than competition seems ever-more relevant as an alternative perspective in the current conjecture where our Conservative government have been accused of openly Darwinist ideas of ‘herd immunity’ (Malnick 2020) and pursuing policy lines based around ideas of ‘survival of the fittest’. Millstein defines mutual aid as ‘collective care’ involving ‘making sure everyone can take time off work, have a home and enough food, stay hydrated and wash their hands, not feel alone or abandoned, receive health and other care’ (Milstein 2020). Commentators have remarked how incredible it is that ‘basic bonds of solidarity, empathy and altruism’ have remained intact in the UK despite a decade of austerity and political polarisation (Quarshie 2020). Similar to Kropotkin, contemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism, for example an activist involved in co-operation Birmingham links the activities of their solidarity kitchen to a crisis of food poverty which has been ongoing since the 2008 crisis, resulting in the widespread use of foodbanks. The author-activist argues that food aid will become one of the most pressing concerns for the working class as we slip into recession again due to COVID-19. The food bank system is critiqued as a form of bureaucratic violence, since applicants are required to engage with a third-sector system who have a huge amount of control over the lives of the working class, who are required to explain their needs and justify themselves to paid professionals who act as gate-keepers for eligibility. This is seen to be part of a deliberate strategy of disempowerment of the working class enacted by both Tories and new Labour. It is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity, and they argue that the popularity of the solidarity kitchen, providing over 150 free vegan meals a day, with demand far in excess of this, pays testament to the need for a political project to combat food poverty, which should operate on multiple levels: ‘Both redistribution projects but also projects creating the conditions for autonomous production’. Such a project would involve not only direct provision through mutual aid, but also challenging land rights, completely re-thinking how farming and agriculture, and radically re-shaping supply chains (Yarrow Way 2020).

In the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society. As described in Chap. 1, in terms of the social/political principle, the very definition of the state for anarchists is that it is parasitic of the creative energies of society. COVID-19 is exposing the fragility of capital, at the same time as capitalists are attempting to mobilise the crisis in their interests, at least partially through the technologies of the state. Radicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish. From the anarchist view both stimulus and securitisation are two sides of the same coin designed to protect the needs of capital by stopping people from revolting in insurrection and/or engaging in exodus from the system by meeting their own needs though social recomposition. However, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services. In the UK, this was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy, in the terms of David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ vision (Quarshie 2020) and has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus. Assuming that authentic anti-authoritarian desire is possible, the political and discursive context has implications for how disaster anarchists and other radicals might seek to act during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This ‘social capital’ trope reappears in the liberal-Left media on COVID-19, for example Raymond (2020) rehearses phraseology of ‘vulnerability’ (the assumption that it is communities that are fragile, not capitalism) and ‘resilience’ (the idea that it is the responsibility of lower-level communities to recover from higher-level shocks, inflicted upon them by the policies of states and inequalities of capitalism—with emphasis on recovery rather than resistance or transformation). From this perspective, mutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state. Rather than seeking resistance to a destructive and authoritarian complicity between state and capital, Raymond proclaims that ‘it’s unfortunate that those in power are unwilling to step up adequately’ (Raymond 2020). From the perspective of reformist social democratic and left-liberal approaches, local movements are lauded insofar as they embody flexible and responsive local knowledge—but at the same time there is a contradictory desire to control them. Associationalist views can often come across as quite critical— for example Naomi Klein is able to critique the dispossession of communities by disaster capitalists using shock doctrine neoliberalism; yet her alternatives rely on Keynesian economic stimulus and the co-optation of social movements into a state-led social democratic consensus (Klein 2007). Anarchists and other radicals might argue that all state responses are two sides to the same coin—the choice whether to co-opt through economic stimulus and capture movements or control/repress through securitisation is always there.

### Antitrust Good---1NR

#### Finishing Paul.

about economic life. Nor, however, should we treat actual competition as inherently tainted by its association with neoclassical theory. Channeled appropriately, competition is healthy rivalry: it encourages technological and operational innovations that can have broad social benefits, and it represents an important check on arbitrary bureaucratic power by preserving outside options for workers, consumers, and businesses. Channeled inappropriately, competition can lead to the destructive undermining of rivals (in contrast to constructive outperformance), overwhelm socially valuable independent enterprises, and destroy existing market settlements characterized by fair prices and decent wages. There is no universal logic of competition for policymakers to apply, either dark or redemptive: it is legal, social, and political choices (almost) all the way down.